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ABSTRACT 
This study examined a case of conflict between Federal 
decision-makers and local citizens regarding the selection 
of a clean-up plan for a coastal area contaminated by 
hazardous wastes. A prolonged dispute over remediation of 
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site resulted in a series 
of facilitated discussions intended to resolve the conflict. 
A descriptive survey was used to explore the effect of the 
discussions upon the risk perceptions of citizens and 
managers, thereby examining the effectiveness of the 
facilitated discussions in resolving conflict at the Site. 
The study found that the facilitated discussions did not 
cause risk perceptions to converge, . and concluded that the 
discussions averted, rather than resolved, conflict between 
citizens and managers at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund 
Site. 
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PREFACE 
The research which is the subject of this paper was 
carried out in 1994 and early 1995. The descriptive survey, 
by means of which the data was collected, was administered 
in the Summer of 1994. 
Survey administration was more difficult than expected. 
The survey concerned a controversial issue; therefore, while 
the cooperation of potential subjects was generally good, 
passions and fear ran high at times. New Bedford is not a 
particularly easy place to survey, for the same reasons 
Federal decision-makers have had difficulty communicating 
there: its poverty and ethnicity. 
Analysis turned out to be somewhat problematical, as 
well. The small size of three of the four study groups 
meant that the statistical analyses had less power than 
would have been optimal. More significant, the study's 
analytical results caused rejection -of not just the major 
hypothesis, but some of the study's assumptions, as well. 
Results therefore forced a reexamination of the problem 
itself, rather than providing a simple resolution. 
The landscape of Superf und has changed since the study 
was conceived and the survey administered. At the time of 
this writing, the statute stands as described herein, and 
the discussion of caselaw is current. However, while the 
103rd Congress was moving toward expansion of Superfund's 
public participation requirements, the 104th is moving 
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toward gutting environmental legislation, generally. It 
remains to be seen what shape, if any, Superfund takes in 
the 104th Congress. 
Regardless, it is hoped that the conclusions drawn 
herein are pertinent, not just to Superfund, but to citizen 
involvement in environmental decisionmaking, generally. To 
the extent that this hope is fulfilled, I must thank Drs. 
West, Nixon, and Hennessey, as well as the many people who 
completed the survey. To the extent that it is not, the 
responsibility is mine, alone. 
v 
T. C. Ardito 
Washington, D.C. 
15 March 1995 
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I. Introduction: The context of the problem. 
I. A. The problem. 
The siting of noxious facilities has become a most 
intransigent problem for public environmental policy. 
Nationally, the defeat of proposals to site such projects 
has become more the rule than the exception (O'Hare and 
Sanderson, 1993). 
The case of the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site 
presents a timely example of the derailment of Federal 
environmental policy as a result of opposition to the siting 
of a "locally undesirable land use,'' or LULU. Twice (first 
in 1984, then again in 1994) residents of the New Bedford 
area have forced the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA) to abandon or modify published remediation 
plans for PCB-contaminated marine sediments in the Acushnet 
River. In August, 1994, yielding to public sentiment, USEPA 
Region I cancelled a contract to incinerate the most 
contaminated Acushnet sediments, in spite of a 1990 Record 
of Decision (ROD) calling for incineration (Ciavettieri, 
1994). The cost of cancelling that one contract has not yet 
been negotiated, but will undoubtedly be considerable 
(MacNeil 1994). 
Governmental and citizens' representatives have been 
taking part in a series of facilitated discussions in an 
attempt to reconcile their differences over the remediation 
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of New Bedford Harbor. The success or failure of this 
effort has bearing on the future of Superfund and on citizen 
participation in governmental decisionmaking, generally. 
This study examines the effectiveness of these facilitated 
discussions in resolving perceptual differences between 
citizens and managers, regarding the risks of the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. In so doing, it seeks to 
illuminate the nature of the conflict itself, within the 
context of risk perception and communication, regarding a 
specific marine hazardous waste site in Southeastern 
Massachusetts. 
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I. B. New Bedford area: Geography. 
I. B. 1. Historical and economic geography. 
The Acushnet River is a small estuary in Southeastern 
Massachusetts, opening onto Buzzards Bay. The mouth of this 
estuary forms a well-protected harbor, New Bedford Harbor, 
which has been used for commercial purposes since English 
settlement in the early 18th Century. By the mid-1700s, the 
river had become an important center of shipbuilding and 
whaling, and the towns on its banks--New Bedford, Acushnet, 
and Fair Haven--prospered and grew. By the middle of the 
19th Century, New Bedford had become the largest whaling 
port in the world (Ellis 1892). 
Manufacturing also began in the 18th Century in the New 
Bedford area, albeit on a small scale. During the 
Nineteenth 
Century, however, as the whaling trade began to decline, the 
great capital which had been accumulated by whaling 
interests began to be shifted into manufacturing; while 
textile mills made up the most important segment of this 
industry, a great diversity of production facilities arose 
(Hegerty 1959) . In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
dozens of these vast mills were built in brick. With the 
mills came the tenements, or "triple-deckers:" three-story 
frame structures built to house the laborers who, with their 
families, migrated to New Bedford to fuel this industrial 
expansion. The mills--many vacant now, or partially so--and 
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the tenements dominate the areas surrounding the Acushnet 
River to this day. 
Architecture is not the only legacy which New Bedford's 
industrial growth left upon the area's environment. From 
the 1940's until the late 1970's, manufacturers of 
electrical equipment dumped industrial wastes into the 
Acushnet River, New Bedford Harbor, and adjacent waters. 
The wastes contained a number of toxic organic and inorganic 
substances, including: polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), 
polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), lead, cadmium, chromium, 
and copper (Pruell et al. 1990; USEPA 1992c, 1989). 
Resulting levels of contamination in estuarine sediments 
ranged as high as 200,000 parts per million (ppm) PCBs 1 
(Fig. I.l) with metals concentrations as high as 4,000 ppm 
(USEPA 1989a; USEPA 1992c). Pruell et al. (1990) have 
stated that the Acushnet River may constitute the worst 
instance of marine PCB pollution in the nation. High 
concentrations of PCBs and metals remain in the area's 
marine biota while elevated levels of PCBs are present in 
the air surrounding the most contaminated areas (US EPA 
1989b; USEPA 1992c) . 
150 ppm PCBs is the concentration above which a substance 
is considered toxic waste for purposes of the Toxic Substances 
and Control Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2601 et seq. See 40 C.F.R. 
761.60 and 761.125. 
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The contamination of the Acushnet River and New Bedford 
Harbor has affected the towns adjoining the estuary in a 
number of ways. Since 1979 the harbor has been closed to 
all fishing (Fig. I.2), while lobstering is illegal in over 
18,000 acres of once-productive ground (USEPA 1992c). Risk 
assessments (RAs) commissioned by USEPA estimate the maximum 
probable lifetime carcinogenic health risk resulting from 
multiple-pathway exposure to ambient levels of PCBs in the 
most contaminated area of the harbor at 3.65 in 1000 (USEPA 
1989b) . The same methodology finds that lifetime 
carcinogenic risks from ingestion of New Bedford Harbor 
seafood might range from 7 in 100 to 2.4 in 10,000, 
depending upon the type of seafood and frequency of 
consumption (USEPA 1992b) 2 • 
Research suggests an economic dimension to the damage 
resulting from the pollution, as well. A study by the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
estimated total economic losses from New Bedford's PCB 
pollution at $39.6 to $52.4 million, the result of fishing 
and beach closures as well as reduced amenity values. 
2 These high-end estimates presuppose almost impossible 
circumstances. The multiple-pathway RA assumes that an 
individual would eat fish, ingest sediments, and come in 
direct contact with sediments from the Hot Spot for her entire 
life. The seafood RA is based upon the consumption of a PCB-
contaminated lobster from the inner harbor, including the 
tomalley (liver), every day of one's life. 
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Another study estimated that property values within two 
miles of the contaminated waters had been reduced by a total 
of $26.2 to $39 million (Grigalunas and Opaluch, 1989). 
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I. B. 2. Sociodemographic characteristics. 
In an era which has seen the flight of "smokestack 
industry" from many of its former strongholds, contaminated 
marine sediments are just one of an array of difficulties 
faced by the towns adjoining the Acushnet River. New 
Bedford, in particular, is among the poorest municipalities 
in Massachusetts; demographic statistics present a picture 
of a metropolitan area which is disadvantaged in numerous 
ways. 
According to the 1990 Census, the population of New 
Bedford totals 99,922, while Fair Haven and Acushnet have 
populations of 16,132 and 9,554, respectively (US Department 
of Commerce, 1992a). New Bedford's median household income 
in 1990 was $22,647, just 61% of the state median; median 
household income in Fair Haven was $30,097, or 81% of the 
state f igure3 • In 1990, 16.8% of New Bedford residents 
lived below the official poverty level, nearly double the 
state average. Unemployment in that city was over 12%, 
while less than half of residents over the age of 25 
reported having finished high school, compared with the 
state-wide average of 80% (US Department of Commerce, 1993 
and 1992b) . 
While New Bedford may be economically disadvantaged in 
comparison to the rest of Massachusetts, the area has 
3Many of the census data which are available 
Bedford and Fair Haven do not exist for Acushnet, 
smaller municipality. 
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for New 
a much 
traditionally represented a gateway to opportunity for one 
particular group: Portuguese immigrants. The New Bedford 
area has been a major center of immigration from Portugal 
since the mid-19th Century (Cardozo 1976) . The Census does 
not separate the Portuguese from other European immigrants, 
nor does it class those of Portuguese descent as "Hispanic," 
so it is difficult to estimate the number of Portuguese 
immigrants and descendents in the New Bedford area. The 
importance of this ethnic group is suggested, however, by 
the fact that nearly 30% of New Bedford residents, according 
to the Census, speak Portuguese at home (US Department of 
Commerce, 1992b). Anecdotally, the Portuguese in New 
Bedford are overwhelmingly islanders: mostly Azorean, with a 
significant minority of Cape Verdeans, as well. Recent 
immigrants often work in the mills, in the fishing fleet, or 
in the construction industries. 
The problem of coastal contamination is particularly 
relevant to a city such as New Bedford. The boarded-up 
mills remind us that the former economic development 
paradigm, successful though it once was, is obsolete. New 
Bedford's extensive, underutilized waterfront, historic 
architecture, and southeastern New England location would 
seem to suggest a potential for the development of tourism. 
It is obvious, however, that a harbor which is best known 
for its concentrations of toxins is unlikely to have the 
appeal necessary to provide the foundation for a burgeoning 
tourism industry. 
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I. c. The New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
C 1 Superfund: History and overview. I. . . 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 3 created a comprehensive 
program to address the problem of hazardous waste sites 
nationwide. As implemented in 1981, the program established 
the National Priorities List (NPL), a list of sites most in 
need of federal action, based on categorization under 
CERCLA's Hazard Ranking System (HRS). The law created the 
Superfund, a $1.6 billion revolving fund, for use by USEPA 
to remediate NPL sites (Hird 1993; Johnston and Nixon 1992) 
In 1986, CERCLA was significantly revised and expanded 
by the passage of the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) . This legislation 
increased the Superfund to $8.S billion, detailed stricter 
site cleanup standards, and increased the role of the public 
in Superfund decisionmaking. While .Superfund has maintained 
popularity with the public as well as with legislators, the 
program has been shown to be economically inefficient as 
well as socially inequitable. Superfund cleanup 
expenditures have been calculated as high as $77 billion per 
statistical life saved for low-risk sites4 , while the 
3As amended by SARA, 42 U.S.C. Sections 9601 et seq. 
4 To put this figure in perspective, highway improvements 
can save lives at a cost of $20,000 to $50,000 per statistical 
life; while an American court, looking at an individual's 
lifetime earnings in a wrongful death suit, might value a life 
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ultimate economic effect of Superfund--in spite of the law's 
"polluter pays" intent--tends to be the redistribution of 
public wealth toward more affluent communities as well as to 
the new army of environmental professionals which the Act 
has spawned (Hird 1993; Environmental Law Institute 1988) 
I. c. 2. Policy history of the New Bedford Harbor Superfund 
Site. 
Elevated levels of PCBs in Buzzards Bay were discovered 
by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in 1973; in the late 
1970's and early 1980's, field_ studies by the State and 
Federal Governments exposed widespread contamination 
throughout the New Bedford Harbor area. The highest 
concentrations were in what has come to be known as the Hot 
Spot, a 5-acre area located in the upper Acushnet River by 
the site of the Aerovox, Inc., capacitor manufacturing 
facility. Sediment concentrations of PCBs in the Hot Spot 
range from 4,000 - 200,000 ppm; toxic metals concentrations 
are as high as 4,000 ppm. In 1982 USEPA placed New Bedford 
Harbor on the National Priorities List (NPL) ; the Superfund 
Site now includes the Acushnet River, New Bedford Harbor, 
and portions of Buzzards Bay (Fig. I.3) It has since been 
divided into two "operable units'' (OUs) in order to create 
sub-projects of manageable size. 
at a million dollars or more (Lewis 1990). 
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The Hot Spot comprises the first OU, while less contaminated 
areas throughout the estuary, harbor, and upper bay comprise 
the second (USEPA 1989a; 1992a; 1992c) (Figs. I. 4, I. 5) . 
In 1983, the Division of Waste Management, USEPA Region 
I, published its first plan concerning the Site, the 
Remedial Action Master Plan (RAMP) . Publication of the RAMP 
was followed by the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study 
(RI/FS) required by CERCLA, resulting in a set of clean-up 
options which USEPA presented to the public in 1984. 
comments on the RAMP from other governmental entities, the 
public, and "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) who 
would have to pay for it were skeptical of the project's 
ability to dredge contaminated sediments without 
exacerbating the problem by dispersing the contamination. 
In response to such criticism, USEPA contracted with 
the US Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a full-scale 
dredging pilot study in the Acushnet. Yet another FS, along 
with a comprehensive risk assessment . (RA), was completed in 
the late 1980's; from this emerged, in 1989, USEPA's second 
major remediation plan for the upper Acushnet, the Hot Spot 
Proposed Plan (HSPP) . This plan called for the dredging of 
10,000 cubic yards (cy) of contaminated sediment from the 
Acushnet River, which would be 11 dewatered 11 in engineered 
shoreside basins, referred to by USEPA as confined disposal 
facilities, or CDFs. 
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The decanted solids would then be incinerated in a hazardous 
waste incinerator5 temporararily assembled on the west bank 
of the Acushnet. The residual ash would be temporarily 
stored in the CDFs, solidified if necessary. The 
incinerator and CDFs would be located at the foot of Sawyer 
street, in the North End of New Bedford, an area, like much 
of the city, of mills and tenements, largely residential. 
According to the Hot Spot Proposed Plan, once the Hot 
spot sediments were dredged and incinerated, USEPA would 
move on to remediate the less highly contaminated areas of 
the Superfund Site (USEPA 1989a) . The Hot Spot Proposed 
Plan was ratified by means of a Record of Decision (ROD) 
which USEPA published in April, 1990, formally selecting the 
dredging and incineration as the means of remediating the 
contamination of the upper Acushnet River (USEPA 1989b) In 
1992, USEPA issued an "Explanation of Significant 
Differences" (ESD) which modified the ROD, stating that the 
incinerator ash would be permanently, rather than 
temporarily, stored in the shoreside CDFs at the foot of 
Sawyer Street (USEPA 1992b). Initially, the Hot Spot 
remediation process was expected to take one year and to 
cost approximately $14.3 million (USEPA 1989a); this figure 
was revised to $16.1 million several years later when the 
plan was modified by the ESD (USEPA 1992b; 1992c) . 
5Referred to, euphemistically, in the Hot Spot Proposed 
Plan as a "thermal destruction facility." 
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In 1983 and 1984, the US Department of Justice filed 
civil complaints against five of New Bedford's electrical 
parts manufacturers for recovery of clean-up costs and 
natural resource damages (Casner et al. 1990). The suits 
were settled by a series of consent decrees from 1990 to 
l992, in which the five PRPs agreed to pay a total of $110 
million to USEPA. Of this amount, $84 million would go 
toward the cleanup; $20 million for restoration under 
CERCLA's natural resource damages provision (42 U.S.C. 
section 9607(f) (1)); and the difference to reimburse the 
state and Federal Government for costs incurred (Allen 
1992a; Garmon 1993). 
18 
D Public involvement in the New Bedford Harbor I. . 
Superfund Site. 
The purpose of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 
u.s.c. 9601 et seq.) is to provide USEPA with the means to 
address sites contaminated by hazardous substances, and to 
broadly empower the Agency to recover costs from polluters 
for cleanup of such sites (Williams 1993; Johnson 1990) 
Within this framework, the Act seems to have an uneasy 
regard for public participation in Superfund decision-
making. It requires a degree of public involvement in 
USEPA's selection and implementation of CERCLA response6 
plans, but is less than unequivocal regarding the relative 
importance of citizen input in the formulation of plans. 
CERCLA contains provisions for citizen suits, but such suits 
are subject to important jurisdictional limits. The courts 
have frequently been called upon to determine the specific 
nature of these limits ~- and therefore the degree to which 
citizens have the right to challenge CERCLA response 
decisions. In most cases, Federal courts have held that 
CERCLA deprives them of jurisdiction to hear any challenge, 
6while the language of CERCLA distinguishes between 
"removal" and "remediation" actions, such distinction is not 
germane to this study; therefore, I will use "response" to 
encompass both removal and remediation of hazardous wastes 
Under CERCLA. 
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by any party, to cleanup activities at a Superfund site 
until such activities have been completed. 
I. D. 1. Statutory requirements. 
As amended, CERCLA requires USEPA to engage in a range 
of public involvement activity in the process of cleaning up 
a superfund site. The Agency is required to solicit public 
comments during the cleanup and to keep the public fully 
informed throughout the process. The Act authorizes the 
Agency to provide citizen's groups with Technical Assistance 
Grants (TAGs) of up to $50,000 . "to obtain technical 
assistance in interpreting information" regarding almost any 
aspect of a Superfund Site and its cleanup. Among other 
things, the TAGs are intended to "facilitate public 
participation in the selection of [a] remedial action at the 
facility" and to "facilitate public participation at all 
stages of a remedial action" (42 U.S.C. Sxn. 9617). The law 
requires USEPA to provide the public with "a reasonable 
opportunity to comment and provide information about [a] 
plan" and "an opportunity for a public meeting in the 
affected area." It requires that USEPA respond to public 
comments, but stops short of saying how much weight the 
Agency should give public comment within the total Superfund 
calculus (42 U.S.C. 9613(k)). Unlike the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1968 (NEPA) , CERCLA does not 
mandate public hearings per se. CERCLA expressly grants 
20 
federal district courts "exclusive jurisdiction over all 
controversies arising under this Act" (42 U.S.C. 9613(b)) 
I. D. 2. Case law pertaining to public participation in 
Superfund. 
In the event that a group of citizens or 
environmentalists objects to a response decision by USEPA7 , 
that group would, conceptually, have three avenues of legal 
recourse. Before the decision had been finalized, the group 
might seek to intervene in a consent decree between USEPA 
and a polluter (potentially responsible party, or PRP, in 
the language of CERCLA). After the decision had been made, 
the group might seek judicial review of a Superfund Record 
of Decision (ROD) in an effort to obtain an injunction 
against implementation of the remediation action. Finally, 
the group might challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute itself. All of these approaches have been tried in 
Federal court, with varying results~ ultimately, however, no 
group has succeeded in blocking, by legal means, the 
implementation of a Superfund remediation decision. 
7As has increasingly happened in recent years when USEPA 
ha~ chosen to employ incineration to remediate contaminated 
soils. Arguably, CERCLA/SARA as written failed to foresee the 
subsequent proliferation of citizen suits seeking to block 
USEPA remediation plans. 
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I. 0 . 2. a. Intervention in Superfund consent decrees. 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 provides for intervention as a 
matter of right by "any person" who "claims an interest" in 
a superfund action (42 U.S.C. 9613(i)). In addition, Rule 
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for 
intervention of right (Rule 24(a)) as well as permissive 
intervention (Rule 24(b)) in cases before the district 
courts. 
A much-cited case concerning the ability of citizens' 
groups and environmental organizations to intervene in 
superfund consent decrees deals directly with the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site: In re Acushnet River and New 
Bedford Harbor8 , (Acushnet IV) . 9 In Acushnet IV, the 
District of Massachusetts considered a motion entered by 
USEPA and a PRP (AVX, Inc., a New Bedford capacitor 
manufacturer) to file a $2 million partial consent decree 
for injury to the natural resources Df New Bedford Harbor. 
The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) sought right of 
permissive intervention, in order to argue for greater 
8722 F.Supp. 888 (D.Mass. 1989). 
9Acushnet IV is one of eight cases of the same title 
concerning the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, considered 
between 1987 and 1989 by Judge Young of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts. Of the eight, only 
Acus~n~t IV and VI bear directly or indirectly upon public 
Phart7c1pation; therefore, only these two will be discussed 
ere1n. 
22 
damages than USEPA would receive under the proposed 
settlement. 
In its opinion, the District Court cited United States 
g_ostal System v. Brennan, 10 to the effect that permissive 
intervention is largely at the discretion of the District 
court. It then turned to the requirements of Rule 24(b), 
finding the foremost to be timeliness. Other considerations 
were: (1) the nature and extent of the intervenor's 
interest; (2) potential delay or prejudice to the rights of 
the original parties; (3) whether the applicant would 
benefit from the intervention; -and (4) whether the 
intervenors would contribute to equitable adjudication of 
the suit. 11 
In spite of the three years which had elapsed between 
the filing of the suit and NWF's motion to intervene, the 
Court found the application timely. It pointed out that NWF 
had had every reason to believe that its interests were 
being represented by the sovereigns,. until the proposed 
consent decree was announced. At that point, the Court 
observed, the difference between "the measure of damages 
sought by the sovereigns as opposed to [that of] the 
Federation" created a new interest "substantial" enough to 
10579 F.2d 188 (2nd Cir. 1978). 
11Citing Brennan and New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. 
United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, (5th Cir.) (en bane) cert . 
denied sub nom. Morial v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. 469 U.S. 
1019, 105 S.Ct. 434, 83 L.Ed.2d 360 (1984), as well as 
S~angler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326 (9th 
Cir. 1977) . 
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justify intervention. The District Court's oft-cited 
rationale for this liberal interpretation of the timeliness 
requirement was that 
[t]o do otherwise would promote a sort of 
prophylactic intervention whereby parties would be 
compelled to intervene in matters simply to 
protect their rights to participate in those 
matters ... downstream ... Such a result would 
obviously be expensive and inefficient. 
Permitting parties like the Federation to 
intervene keeps the number of parties in a dispute 
at a minimum unless and until a real divergence of 
interests arises. 
The Court therefore allowed NWF to intervene. 
A final settlement of $12.6 million between USEPA, AVX, 
and one other PRP, Belleville, was approved by the District 
Court in 1991 over NWF's objections. The Federation brought 
appeal before the First Circuit in United States v. AVX 
Corporation12 , seeking to argue that the consent decree 
violated CERCLA's requirements. The Court held that it 
could not consider such substantive issues because, in the 
wake of a settlement by the original parties, NWF's appeal 
was rendered moot by the Federation's inability to satisfy 
the prevenient issue of standing. 
The First Circuit cited the US Supreme Court in Diamond 
v. Charles 13 to demonstrate an appellant's need to show 
independent standing following settlement of a suit in 
district court. In Diamond, Justice Blackmun stated that 
"an intervenor's right to continue a suit in the absence of 
12962 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1992). 
13 4 7 6 u . s . 5 4 I 10 6 s . Ct . 16 9 7 I 9 0 L . Ed . 2 d 4 8 ( 19 8 6 ) . 
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the party on whose side intervention was permitted is 
contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills 
the requirements of Art . III." The appellate court then 
cited a number of other Supreme Court cases in order to 
define such standing. Calling in particular upon Allen v. 
wright, 14 the Court observed that standing required a 
"distinct and palpable" injury which was "fairly traceable" 
to the alleged actions of the defendant. 
The First Circuit pointed out that such injury could be 
aesthetic or environmental as well as physical or 
economic. 15 But due to Article . I I I's limitation that the 
courts hear only "cases or controversies," the injury must 
be a factual one, "something more than an academic exercise 
in the conceivable" (citing SCRAP). The appellate court 
found that while "[t]here is no question that the interests 
which NWF seeks to protect are 'germane to the 
organization's purpose' " 16 the Federation could not show the 
type of "'concrete injury' ... needed .to confer standing in an 
environmental suit". 17 Rather, the Court found NWF' s claim 
that its "79,000 members and supporters in Massachusetts" 
~ 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). 
15Citing the landmark environmental cases United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) and Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361~ 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). 
16c. . it1ng Hunt v. Washington State Aoole Advertising 
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 33, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). 
11c. • R . it1ng, accord, Conservation Law Foundation of N.E. v. 
e1lly, 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991). 
25 
"have been and will continue to be harmed by [PCB] releases" 
in New Bedford Harbor inadequate. "NWF," it observed, 
"makes only the most nebulous allegations regarding its 
member's identities and their connection to the relevant 
geographic area ... Gauzy generalities of this sort, 
unsubstantiated by any factual foundation, cannot survive 
[the original litigants'] motion to dismiss." 
Like the Acushnet IV court, district and appellate 
courts nationwide have found timeliness to be the threshold 
consideration for intervention in CERCLA consent decrees 18 • 
with respect to Acushnet IV's second requirement, that the 
would-be intervenor show injury-in-fact, a number of 
subsequent opinions have used the precedent of New Orleans 
Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line, supra, to 
distinguish between a mere "economic interest" and one which 
is "legally protectable," and thus adequate to establish the 
right to intervene. 19 
Once a party has shown that its request for 
intervention has satisfied the two requirements set forth in 
Acushnet IV, a court may review a Superfund consent decree. 
In recent years, the dominant standard for such review has 
18S 1 . . h 1 . ee, e.g., B oomington v. Westing ouse E ectric Corp., 
824 F.2d 531, 17 E.L.R. 21185 (7th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Acton Corp. on behalf of Vikoa, 131 F.R.D. 431 (D.N.J. 
1990); United States v. Bliss 132 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.Mo. 1990); 
Dr:ited States v. BASF-Inmont Corp., 819 F.Supp. 601 (E.D. 
Mich . 1993) . 
. 
19See, e . g. ,Acton and Bliss, op cit. note 12, as well as 
United States v. ABC Industries 153 F R D 603 (W D Mi' ch 1993), I • • • • • • 
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been the three-prong test set forth by the Sixth Circuit in 
yPited States v. Azko Coatings of America, Inc. 20 : that the 
consent decree be fair, reasonable, and consistent with the 
goals of CERCLA (Johnson 1993). 
I. D. 2. b. Challenges to remedial decisions. 
Like much Federal environmental legislation, CERCLA as 
amended by SARA contains express provision for citizen 
suits, assigning jurisdiction over such controversies to the 
district courts: 
(a) AUTHORITY TO BRING CIVIL ACTIONS. -- Except as 
provided ... in section 9613(h) ... any person may 
commence a civil action on his own 
behalf ... against any person (including the United 
States ... ) who is alleged to be in violation of 
any standard, regulation, condition, requirement 
or order [made] pursuant to this 
chapter ... or ... against the President or ... the 
Administrator of [USEPA] ... where there is alleged 
a failure ... to perform any act or duty under this 
chapter .. . 
(c) RELIEF. -- The district court shall have 
jurisdiction ... (42 U.S.C. 9659) . 
While a party could clearly make use of this provision to 
force USEPA to initiate action at a hazardous waste si te21 , 
it has proven to be of little use to groups wishing to 
contest Superfund remediation decisions. The principal 
reason for this is that CERCLA Section 9613(h) has been held 
W949 F.2d 1409, 22 E.L.R. 20405 (6th Cir. 1991). 
21See . e . g., U. s. E. P.A. v. Environmental Waste Control, 
917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990) 
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to establish strict jurisdictional limits on challenges to 
USEPA'S Superfund decision-making: 
(h) TIMING OF REVIEW. -- No Federal court shall 
have jurisdiction under Federal law other than 
under section 1332 of title 28 of United States 
Code (relating to diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction) or under State law ... relating to 
cleanup standards ... to review any challenges to 
removal or remedial action selected under section 
9604 [removal and remedial actions] ... in any 
action except one of the following .. . 
(4) An action under section 9659 (relating to 
citizen suits) alleging that the removal or 
remedial action taken under section 9604 of 
this chapter or secured under section 9606 of 
this title was in violation of any 
requirement of this chapter. Such an action 
may not be brought with regard to a removal 
where a remedial action is to be undertaken 
at the site (42 U.S.C. 9613) (emphasis 
added). 
Exception (4) to the jurisdictional bar of 9613(h) has 
been a pivotal issue in CERCLA citizens' suits. 
Specifically, controversy has adhered to the precise meaning 
of "removal," and the question of exactly what time limit is 
implied by the construction "is to be undertaken." The 
ambiguity of 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) (4) has forced Federal courts 
to repeatedly revisit the legislative history of the 
CERCLA/SARA. Typically, courts have held that 9613(h) bars 
any attempt to block or alter USEPA's Superfund cleanup 
decisions; that is, a remedial action cannot be challenged 
under the citizen suit provision until it has been 
completed. Moreover, this jurisdictional bar has generally 
been held to be comprehensive in scope, preventing not only 
direct challenges to USEPA remediation plans, but challenges 
to parts of plans, as well as suits brought under other 
28 
environmental laws which might have bearing upon CERCLA 
. 22 
actions. 
once a court does review a ROD, the language of CERCLA 
limits judicial review to the administrative record: 
( j ) JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
(1) LIMITATION. . .. any judicial action 
under this chapter ... shall be limited to the 
administrative record ... 
(2) STANDARD. -- ... the court shall uphold 
[USEPA's] decision in selecting the response 
action unless the objecting party can 
demonstrate, on the administrative record, 
that the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law (42 U.S.C. 9613). 
Though no suit was ever brought under Section 9613 
regarding USEPA's plans at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund 
Site, the applicability of this standard to that case was 
verified by the District of Massachusetts in In re Acushnet 
River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged PCB 
Pollution23 (Acushnet VI). Important precedents for the 
District Court in this instance were two suits brought by 
PRPs, in which district courts found only the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard of review was appropriate to CERCLA 
challenges. 24 
nThe exception of United States v. State of Colorado, 990 
F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 127 L.Ed.2d 216, 114 
S.Ct. 922, infra, is notable, but arguably a special case. 
The outcome of Colorado hinged on the determination that a 
state has the right to enforce its own hazardous waste law 
(enacted, in this case, pursuant to RCRA) at a Superfund site. 
n722 F.Supp. 888 (D.Mass. 1989) 
24United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 679 F. Supp. 
~59 (S.D.Ind. 1987) and United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 669 
.Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1987). 
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The jurisdictional bar of CERCLA section 9613(h) was 
written into the law with the 1986 SARA reauthorization . 
According to Williams (1993), it appears to be a 
codification by Congress of a decision reached by the 
District of New Jersey in Lone Pine Steering Committee v . 
u.s. E.P.A .. ~ In Lone Pine, a group of PRPs brought suit 
against USEPA, seeking to block a ROD relating to the 
closure of a landfill which had been placed on the National 
Priorities List (NPL) 26 as a result of the illegal dumping 
there of hazardous wastes. 27 The plaintiffs claimed that 
USEPA's closure plan was unnecessarily elaborate and wished 
to implement a cheaper one, which they argued no less 
adequate, in order to avoid potential liability under CERCLA 
for the more expensive plan. The District Court examined 
questions of jurisdiction and scope of review. 
~600 F.Supp 1487 (D.N.J. 1985), 
Envt . Rep.Cas. 1568, 16 E.L.R. 20009, 
4 7 6 u. s . 1115 I 9 0 L . Ed . 2 d 6 5 4 I 
Envt.Rep.Cas . 1744. 
affirmed 777 F.2d 882, 23 
(3rd Cir . ), cert . denied 
106 S.Ct. 1970, 25 
uPlacement on the NPL is among the first steps toward 
cleanup of a hazardous waste site under CERCLA: see 42 U. S.C . 
Section 9605. 
27While the focus of this study is on public participation 
an~ citizen suits, and while the Sxn. 9613(h) (4) exception 
which most concerns us relates to citizen suits, there a good 
deal of precedential overlap between CERCLA challenges brought 
by.citizens, PRPs, and state governments. Therefore, while 
thi~ discussion will center upon citizen suits, relevant 
actions brought by other types of parties must be mentioned, 
as well. 
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citing the US Supreme Court in Block v. Community 
Nµtrition Institute, 28 the Court noted that the extent to 
which a statute precluded judicial review was determined not 
only by the language of the law, but by its structure and 
nature, as well as its legislative history. Delving into 
CERCLA's history as well as the law's intent, the District 
court concluded that 
both the legislative history and the language of 
CERCLA suggest that to allow judicial review of a 
ROD by an entity which may (or may not) be the 
subject of a subsequent recovery action would 
frustrate Congress' intent to provide a mechanism 
whereby hazardous sites can be neutralized 
expeditiously. 
Moreover, the Court found, some of the events of this 
particular case were "suggestive of the bog into which 
courts would descend if CERCLA were interpreted to permit 
[PRPs] to obtain judicial review of the issuance of a ROD." 
The Court also considered the limited precedent which 
had developed following the passage of the 1982 law, citing 
opinions which had found that courts lacked jurisdiction to 
review PRP claims brought to enjoin Superfund cleanup 
activities. 29 Conversely, the Court considered and 
disagreed with J.V. Peters v. Ruckelshaus, 30 wherein the 
Northern District of Ohio had held that PRPs did indeed have 
D467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). 
29united States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 104 F.Supp. 405 
(N.D.Ill. 1984) and Aminoil v. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, 599 F.Supp. 69 (D.Calif. 1984). 
~584 F.Supp. 1005 (N.D.Ohio, 1984), affirmed 767 F.2d 263 
(6th Cir. 1985). 
31 
the right to obtain judicial review of a Superfund ROD. The 
~eter...§. court had ruled the issuance of a ROD by USEPA a 
"final administrative action" subject to judicial review 
under CERCLA; moreover it found the PRPs' potential 
liability for the clean-up to comprise the "actual or 
threatened injury" required to establish standing under 
Article III. 31 The reasoning which the Lone Pine court 
relied upon to reject the precedent of Peters has become a 
fundamental justification for denying PRPs review of USEPA 
RODs: that the PRPs will have the opportunity to state their 
case in the subsequent CERCLA cost recovery suit, and that 
therefore the ROD is not in and of itself "a final agency 
action." In the words of the Court: 
[There is] no reason why plaintiffs cannot raise 
as a defense in a cost recovery action every 
objection to the ROD which they could legitimately 
raise in a judicial proceeding at this time. 
The plaintiffs' motion was accordingly dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
It is important to note that the reasoning which the 
District Court employed in Lone Pine would not fully apply 
to citizens' suits, since unlike PRPs, citizens do not have 
the subsequent opportunity to state their case in a cost 
recovery suit, and because monetary damages are 
fundamentally different from claims of health impacts. 
31Ul . timately, however, the Peters court dismissed 
PRPs' suit for failure to state an actionable claim. 
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The 
the 
Pine court acknowledged as much when it stated, dictum, k_l.,!.!o~n~eS:.-:..==---
that 
the statute may contemplate a different rule of 
judicial review in the case of a victim of a 
hazardous waste site. The statute is designed 
particularly to protect such persons and, unlike 
the persons responsible for the hazardous waste, 
no specific provision is contained in the statute 
under which they can obtain judicial review ... In 
any event, it is unnecessary to resolve that 
question now. 
In codifying the decision of the Lone Pine court by means of 
CERCLA Section 9613(h) in the SARA reauthorization, Congress 
did nothing to clear up the ambiguity which the Court had 
alluded to. Since the passage -of SARA, therefore, courts 
have been forced to grapple with the meaning of Section 9613 
and its applicability to citizens' suits. 32 
Two Federal cases heard soon after the passage of SARA 
have become important precedents regarding this question, 
although each took an opposite view of the issue: Cabot 
Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agencv33 and 
Alabama v. United States Environmental Protection Agency. 34 
In Cabot, PRPs attempting to block a CERCLA ROD sued as 
citizens. The PRPs argued that under the 42 U. S . C. 
9613 (h) (4) exception, citizens' suits were eligible for pre-
32The Third Circuit, in U.S. v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 
Inc., 31 F.3d 138 (3rd. Cir. 1994), called the legislative 
history of 9613 (h) (4) "confusing" and the citizens' suit 
provision "a troublesome one." 
D677 F S 2 8 20835 (E ) . upp. 8 3, 1 E . L.R. .D.Pa. 1988 . 
M871 F.2d 1548, 19 E.L.R. 20956 (11th Cir . 1989) cert. 
denied 493 U.S. 991, 107 L.Ed.2d 535, 110 S.Ct. 538, appeal 
after remand 925 F.2d 385, 21 E.L.R. 21026 (11th Cir). 
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enforcement review. The Court examined the language and 
legislative history of CERCLA in order to evaluate the 
claim. While deciding that the PRPs were ineligible to 
masquerade as citizens for the purpose of employing the 
exception, the Court did find, dictum, that some of the 
legislative history of CERCLA/SARA "emphasized the 
distinction between suits focusing on health or 
environmental concerns and suits alleging monetary harm" in 
terms of judicial review . Therefore, the District Court 
concluded, in the case of a true citizens' suit, Section 
9613(h) (4) "arguably permits challenges to EPA's plans even 
before they have been implemented." The dictum of the Cabot 
court has been used by citizens as well as PRPs in 
subsequent cases to argue for judicial review of Superfund 
response actions, in each case without success.~ 
The Cabot court rejected, as well, PRPs' claim that the 
ROD was separable from "removal or remedial action" within 
the context of CERCLA. The idea that each individual aspect 
of a CERCLA response action is, in and of itself, a "removal 
or remedial action," protected by the Section 9613(h) 
jurisdictional bar, has proven to be most significant to the 
R . 35See, e.g. , Neiohborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. 
eill~, 716 F.Supp. 828, 19 E.L.R. 21165 (D.N.J. 1989); U.S. 
~- Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 (3rd Cir. 1994); and 
1~nford Downwinders v. Dowdle, 841 F.Supp. 1050 (E.D.Wash. 93) . 
34 
case law of CERCLA, and has been shared by many courts which 
have examined the Act . 36 
In Alabama v. United States Environmental Protection 
agency, 37 the Eleventh Circuit came to a very different 
conclusion than did Cabot regarding the eligibility of 
citizens' suits for judicial review. In this instance, 
officials of the State of Alabama brought suit as private 
citizens to enjoin shipment of hazardous wastes from a 
superfund Site in Texas to a treatment facility in Alabama. 
The District Court had granted a preliminary injunction and 
USEPA appealed, with Texas intervening. 
Inter alia, the Court considered the plaintiffs' claim 
that they were entitled to more meaningful involvement in 
USEPA's decision-making than they had been allowed. The 
plaintiffs argued that two statutes established Federal 
jurisdiction to compel compliance with CERCLA: (1) under 
CERCLA, the Section 9659 citizens' suit provision and the 
Section 9613 granting of jurisdiction to the district 
courts; and (2) the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 
36E. g. Cooper Industries, Inc . v. United States EPA, 775 
F.Supp. 1027, 34 Envt.Rep.Cas. 1290, 22 E.L.R. 20608 
(W.D . Mich. 1991); Environmental Waste Control, Inc. v. Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 763 F.Supp 1576, 33 
Envt.Rep.Cas. 1297, 21 E.L.R. 21380 (N.D.Ga. 1991); North 
Shore Gas v. EPA 930 F. 2d 1239, 32 Envt. Rep. Cas . 2049, 21 
E.L.R. 21038 (7th Cir. 1991); and In re Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation Litigation, 780 F.Supp. 1551, 34 Envt.Rep.Cas. 
1145, 22 E.L . R . 20703 (E.D.Wash. 1991). 
TI871 F.2d 1548, 19 E.L . R. 20956 (11th Cir. 1989) cert. 
denied 493 U.S. 991, 107 L.Ed.2d 535, 110 S.Ct. 538, appeal 
after remand 925 F.2d 385, 21 E.L.R. 21026 (11th Cir.). 
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u.s.c. section 701 et seq., which provides, inter alia, that 
a "person suffering legal wrong ... or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action ... is entitled to judicial 
review." 
The Alabama court first examined the language of 42 
u.s.c. 9613(h) (4), allowing for judicial review of citizens' 
actions only after a remedial action has been "taken" or 
"secured." It cited the U.S. Supreme Court in Consumer 
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 38 to the 
effect that the language of a statute is conclusive 
"[a]bsent clear legislative intent to the contrary;" based 
on the plain language of Section 9613(h) (4), the Court found 
the statute to require that the remedial action be complete 
before a case might be heard. 
Turning next to the CERCLA's legislative history, the 
Eleventh Circuit, unlike the Cabot court, found it 
supportive of the idea that the statute barred judicial 
review of citizen suits until the completion of a CERCLA 
response action. In light of the delay which inevitably 
attends lawsuits, the Court emphasized the importance of its 
observation that "the primary purpose of CERCLA is the 
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites." The Alabama court 
acknowledged Cabot but emphasized the precedent of Lone 
Pine, finding that both the language and intent of CERCLA 
barred precompletion judicial review of Superfund cleanup 
~447 U.S. 102, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 
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actions. It rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the ROD 
a ction "taken" within the meaning of CERCLA, thus was an 
eligible for challenge under the 9613 (h) (4) exception; 
moreover, based on CERCLA's legislative history, the Court 
found that the broad jurisdictional bar of Section 9613 
applied equally to the plaintiffs' APA claim. 
The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, reversed the finding 
of the District Court and dismissed the case for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. The Alabama decision, denied 
certiorari by the Supreme Court, has probably been the 
single most important precedent in the subsequent 
development of CERCLA/SARA case law. It used case law 
dealing with PRP claims to apply CERCLA's jurisdictional bar 
to true citizen suits, thus extending the scope of the 
9613 (h) ( 4) prohibition. 
The emphasis of the Alabama opinion on CERCLA's 
prioritization of an expeditious clean-up, as well as its 
finding that a remedial action must .have been completed 
before it may be reviewed, has been used by numerous courts 
to rebuff plaintiffs' attempts to challenge Superfund 
remediation decisions.~ Not all courts which have examined 
~See, e.g., Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 20 E.L.R. 
20669, reh. den., en bane, (7th Cir. 1990) cert. denied Frey 
v . Reilly, 498 U.S. 981, 112 L.Ed.2d 521, 111 S.Ct. 509, reh. 
den. 498 U.S. 1074, 112 L.Ed.2d 863, 111 S.Ct. 802; In re 
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 780 F.Supp. 1551, 34 
Envt.Rep.Cas. 1145, 22 E.L.R. 20703 (E.D.Wash. 1991); Arkansas 
~eace ~enter v. Dept. of Pollution Control, 999 F.2d. 1212 
8th Cir. 1993) cert . denied 128 L.Ed . 2d 70, 114 S.Ct. 1397, 62 U.S.L.W. 3657; Hanford Downwinders v. Dowdle, 841 F.Supp. 
lOSO (E.D.Wash. 1993) . 
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its precedent, however, have been as comfortable that the 
language and legislative history of Section 9613 precluded 
11 t d . 1 t' ~ citizen cha enges o reme ia ac ions. 
Just a year after it denied the Eleventh Circuit's 
b)..abama decision certiorari, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari of a similar decision by the Seventh Circuit in 
· 11 41 Schalk v. Rei y. This case concerned suits brought by 
local residents seeking to prevent USEPA from incinerating 
PCB-contaminated wastes as part of a Superfund cleanup in 
Bloomington, Indiana. The District Court had dismissed the 
cases separately, finding that _ they sought the type of pre-
enforcement review barred by CERCLA; the Court of Appeals 
heard a consolidated appeal. As in Lone Pine, supra, the 
plaintiffs in Schalk claimed that USEPA had, inter alia, 
violated NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by selecting 
incineration as a remedy without adequate public hearings or 
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). They argued that, 
in challenging the consent decree wherein USEPA chose the 
contested remedy, they were challenging an "action taken" 
40In U.S. v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 (3rd Cir. 
1994), the Third Circuit stated, dictum, that a district court 
might be able to grant an injunction under 42 U.S.C. 
9613(h) (4) where citizens could show an imminent threat of 
"irreparable harm to public health or the environment. C.f. 
Arkansas Peace Center v. Dept. of Pollution Control, op cit. 
note 3 and Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 
F.Supp. 828, 19 E.L.R. 21165 (D.N.J. 1989). 
419 
. 00 F.2d 1091, 20 E.L.R. 
Cir. 1990) cert. denied Frey 
L.Ed.2d 521, 111 S.Ct. 509, 
L.Ed.2d 863, 111 S.Ct. 802. 
20669, reh. den., en bane, 
v. Reilly, 498 U.S. 981, 
reh. den. 498 U.S. 1074, 
38 
(7th 
112 
112 
within the meaning of CERCLA; thus theirs was a post-
enforcement challenge, to which the District Court had 
improperly applied the Section 9613(h) denial of pre-
enforcement review. 
The Court of Appeals did not agree. Relying on the 
plain language of CERCLA, the Seventh Circuit found that 
"[t]he obvious meaning of this statute is that when a remedy 
has been selected, no challenge to the cleanup may occur 
prior to completion of the remedy." The Court leaned 
heavily upon the precedent of Alabama to bolster its 
argument; since its decision was based primarily upon the 
language of the statute, it made only the most cursory 
examination of SARA's legislative history. It dismissed the 
plaintiffs due process claims with little more than a wave 
of the hand, and affirmed the decisions of the District 
Court. 
Subsequent decisions regarding CERCLA's citizen-suit 
provisions have been generally consistent with the opinions 
of Alabama and Schalk, finding that 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) (4) 
expressly bars judicial review of a Superfund clean-up until 
such action has been completed. 42 As recently as 1993, 
however, an Arkansas district court came to the opposite 
• 
42E.g. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, Q2 
cit.; Reynolds v. Lujan, 785 F.Supp. 152 (D.N.M. 1992); 
Redland Soccer Club v. Dept. of Army, 801 F.Supp. 1432 
{M.D.Pa. 1992); Heart of America Northwest v. Westinohouse 
Hanford, 820 F.Supp. 1265 {E.D.Wash. 1993). A notable recent 
exception is U.S. v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 {3rd 
Cir. 1994): see note 34. 
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conclusion in a case involving a Superfund clean-up quite 
similar to that of New Bedford. Overruled by an appellate 
decision which was, like Alabama and Schalk, denied 
certiorari by the Supreme Court, Arkansas Peace Center v. 
Dept. of Pollution Control43 stands as yet another statement 
of the federal courts' unwillingness to review USEPA's 
superfund remediation decisions. 
In Arkansas Peace Center, a citizens' group attempted 
to take advantage of the Colorado precedent by using a RCRA 
claim to block the incineration of dioxin-contaminated waste 
at the controversial Vertac incinerator in Arkansas. The 
subject of their action was a USEPA ROD which chose 
incineration as the selected remedy for some 28,000 drums, 
containing two types of dioxin, at an abandoned herbicide 
and pesticide plant. 
The group had brought suit in Federal District Court, 
alleging inter alia that USEPA was in violation of RCRA, 42 
U.S.C. 6901 et seq., insofar as it had failed to demonstrate 
that its incinerator would meet its own standard for dioxin 
removal efficiency.« The District Court stated that it had 
jurisdiction to consider no more than defendants' compliance 
with USEPA's regulations; in so doing, however, the Court 
43 999 F.2d. 1212 (8th Cir. 1993) cert. denied 128 L.Ed.2d 
70, 114 S.Ct. 1397, 62 U.S.L.W. 3657. 
«The so-called "six nines" requirement, 40 C.F.R. 
~64: 343 {a) (2), which mandates that certain hazardous waste 
incinerators must achieve a destruction and removal efficiency 
(DRE) of 99.9999%. 
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found that a violation had occurred. Given a probability 
that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits, and that "a 
violation of regulations tips the scale heavily toward a 
determination that potential irreparable harm to plaintiffs 
outweighs the potential harm to defendants," the District 
court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent 
incineration of the wastes. Defendants appealed. 
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the District Court had 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant injunction, 
basing its determination on the plain language of CERCLA as 
well as the now-considerable citizen-suit case law. The 
court of Appeals cited Alabama to support its judgement that 
citizens' suits were barred until the completion of a CERCLA 
response action, and Schalk to the effect that challenges to 
the response based on other environmental laws would result 
in the same delays that Congress sought to prevent as would 
challenges based on CERCLA itself. The Court considered 
plaintiffs' example of Colorado, but. found that CERCLA's 
explicit protection of states' rights to enforce their own 
environmental laws distinguished it from the case at bar. 
The Court of Appeals, therefore, reversed the District 
Court's granting of preliminary injunction, and remanded the 
case. 
Unlike many similar sites, New Bedford Harbor was never 
the subject of a citizen suit. Had the citizens who 
objected to USEPA's ROD attempted to use CERCLA's citizen 
suit provisions to block the incineration, case law 
41 
demonstrates that they probably would have failed as a 
result of the 9613(h) jurisdictional bar. Some district 
courts have clearly been uncomfortable with this bar, but 
they have been reigned in by courts of appeals, whose 
decisions, in turn, have been denied certiorari by the US 
supreme Court. CERCLA's citizen-suit provisions, as 
interpreted by the judiciary, appear to offer scant recourse 
for citizens who would contest a USEPA Superfund remediation 
decision. 
I. D. 2. c. Constitutional challenges to CERCLA. 
Throughout the case law of CERCLA, citizens' groups and 
PRPs seeking to contest CERCLA response actions have argued 
that the Constitutional right to due process is superior to 
the jurisdictional bar of 42 U.S.C. Section 9613(h) .~ 
Generally speaking, however, courts which have specifically 
considered this issue have held that the section's denial of 
pre-enforcement judicial review encompasses Constitutional 
claims. In Lone Pine Steering Committee v. U. S.E.P.A., 
supra, and Neighborhood Toxic Emergency v. Reilly, supra, 
for example, district courts stated explicitly that the 
jurisdictional bar of 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) prevented them from 
45See, e.g., J.V. Peters v. Ruckelshaus, 584 F.Supp. 1005 
(N.D.Ohio, E.D.1984); U.S. v. Sevmour Recycling Corp., 679 
F.Supp. 859 (S.D.Ind. 1987); Lone Pine Steering Committee v. 
U.S.E.P.A, supra; Alabama v. United States Environmental 
.E..r~tection Agency, supra; and Neighborhood Toxic Emergency v. 
Reilly, supra. 
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hearing Constitutional claims related to ongoing CERCLA 
cleanups. 
In 1991, however , the First Circuit allowed a 
constitutional claim to stand in a CERCLA case: Reardon v . 
u.s.~ Reardon concerned a hazardous waste site to which 
=---
USEPA had attached a lien in order to recover response 
costs, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 9607, CERCLA's section 
on "Liability." Reardon, landowner and PRP, brought suit in 
District Court to argue that the lien should be removed from 
the property. Two of the plaintiff's three claims 
specifically contested USEPA's . application of CERCLA's lien 
provision to Reardon 1s property; the third "asserted that 
EPA's imposition of the lien without a hearing violated the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution." 
The District Court found that CERCLA's limitation of 
judicial review, 42 U.S.C. 9613(h), divested it of 
jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's statutory claims . 
Considering the Constitutional claim, the Court stated that, 
while Section 9613(h) purported to deny jurisdiction here, 
as well, Congress in fact lacked such power. However, 
finding that the lien under consideration "did not amount to 
a taking of a 'significant property interest' protected by 
the due process clause," the District Court dismissed the 
plaintiff 1s complaint. 
%947 F.2d 1509, 34 Envt.Rep.Cas. 1070, 22 E.L . R . 20292 (1st c· ) ir . 1991 . 
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Reardon appealed, and the First Circuit, finding that 
section 9613(h) permitted the statutory challenges to the 
imposition of the lien, reversed the District Court's 
decision without reaching the Constitutional question. 
USEPA petitioned for rehearing and the First Circuit, en 
bane, considered the Constitutional issue. 
on rehearing, the appellate court agreed with the 
District Court that the filing of the lien was the type of 
"enforcement activity" which was protected by the 
jurisdictional bar of 42 U.S . C. 9613(h). Examining the 
language and legislative history of CERCLA/SARA, the Court 
developed its argument in much the same way as had other 
courts which rejected challenges to CERCLA response 
activities. 
However, the First Circuit's reading of the language of 
Section 9613(h) led it to conclude that the section's 
jurisdictional bar, in referring to "removal or remedial 
actions selected under section 9604, ." applied only to 
challenges concerning USEPA's administration of the statute, 
not the statute itself. The Court cited the US Supreme 
Court to the effect that "where Congress intends to preclude 
judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so 
must be clear, 1147 but found no such clear intent within the 
language of CERCLA/SARA. It rejected the reasoning of two 
47c. • it1ng Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct . 2047, 100 
L.Ed.2d 632 (1988); Weinberger v . Salfi, 422 U.S . 749, 95 
S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); and Johnson v. Robinson, 
415 U.S . 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L . Ed.2d 389 (1974) . 
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earlier cases which had found that 9613(h) did indeed 
preclude all Constitutional challenges to CERCLA response 
actions, 48 because they did not distinguish between 
"challenges to EPA's administration of CERCLA, and 
challenges to CERCLA itself." The Court considered Lone 
Pine, supra, as well, but observed that that case did not 
rule on the plaintiff's Constitutional claim. 
The First Circuit also examined CERCLA/SARA's 
legislative history, finding no clear evidence of 
congressional intent to bar Constitutional claims against 
CERCLA . It cited a case concerning immigration law, McNary 
v. Haitian Refugee Center, 49 in which the Supreme Court 
distinguished between administration of a statute and 
Constitutional claims against the statute itself with 
respect to a similar statutory jurisdictional bar. 
Finding that 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) could not preclude 
judicial review of Constitutional challenges to CERCLA 
itself, the First Circuit went on to. consider Reardon's due 
process claim, finding further that CERCLA's lien provisions 
had deprived Reardon of a "significant property interest" 
without due process of law. A majority of the First Circuit 
panel, therefore, reversed and remanded the constitutional 
portion of the suit. Circuit Judge Cyr authored a 
48Barmet Aluminum v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991) 
and South Macomb Disposal Authority v. U.S. E. P.A., 681 F. Supp. 
l244 (E.D.Mich. 1988). 
~498 U.S . 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991). 
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dissenting opinion, disagreeing not with the majority's 
conclusion that 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) barred Constitutional 
challenges to CERCLA, but that due process had been denied 
in this particular instance. 
I. D. 2. d. Case law: Conclusion. 
The history of citizen challenges to CERCLA response 
actions and the "Timing of Review" provision (42 U.S.C . 
g613(h)) demonstrates that the statute has been created as 
much by the courts as by Congress. Faced with ambiguous 
statutory language, courts have been forced to consider 
every conceivable permutation of the citizen challenge to a 
CERCLA cleanup, and to rely heavily upon a legislative 
history which is not without internal contradictions. Eight 
years after the passage of the SARA reauthorization, CERCLA 
case law remains in flux, particularly in the First Circuit. 
The weight of case law at this point clearly favors the 
conclusion that pre-completion challenges to USEPA's 
administration of CERCLA cleanups are barred by 9613(h). 
However, the First Circuit's finding in Reardon, supra, 
suggests that a Massachusetts citizens' group which was able 
to craft the perfect challenge to CERCLA's constitutionality 
might find a yet-unexploited avenue of legal recourse. 
Given the number of NPL sites in the Nation and the 
controversy which currently attends some of USEPA's 
preferred response methods, it seems certain that citizens' 
groups will continue thread their way through the tortuous 
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case law of CERCLA's citizens-suit provision and 
jurisdictional bar, in an effort to influence USEPA response 
decisions at CERCLA sites. 
This observation has two implications for the study at 
hand. First, that the public participation provisions of 
CERCLA are in need of revision. Congress must clarify the 
statute's intent and provide for a medium of 
public/governmental communication which is more cost-
effective than the federal courts. Second, that if USEPA 
can avert legal challenges to its CERCLA response decisions 
by involving the public - -as ultimately took place in New 
Bedford, by means of ODR's facilitated discussions--the 
benefits to public and agency alike might be substantial. 
I. D. 3. Prospective changes in CERCLA 1 s public 
participation requirements. 
In October, 1994, leaders of Congress and the Clinton 
Administration were forced by congressional Republicans to 
abandon a major, year-long effort to rewrite the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act. While the Administration and Democratic 
leaders insisted that the legislation would be revived in 
1995, just what shape the reauthorization might then take 
remains uncertain (Cushman 1995) . 
During 1994, committees in both the House and Senate 
worked at revisions to CERCLA/SARA which would have 
significantly expanded public participation in Superfund. 
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House version, titled the Superfund Reform Act of 1994 The 
3000), called for increasing the uses to which TAGs (H. 
might be put and specified much more comprehensive public 
notification and involvement. It would require public 
meetings at every major step of a Superfund cleanup as well 
as the formation of state Citizen Information and Access 
offices to inform residents of the Superfund sites in their 
neighborhoods (US House of Representatives, 1994). But 
perhaps the most fundamental way in which the House bill 
would have changed the public participation section of the 
superfund statute lay in the bill's explicit requirement 
that USEPA seek out and take into account the sentiments of 
local residents regarding a Superfund remediation: 
SEC. 101. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
(f) (3). To the extent practicable ... [USEPA] shall 
solicit and evaluate concerns, interests, and 
information from the community likely [to be] 
affected by the facility ... 
(f) (4). During the remedial investigation and 
feasibility study, [USEPA] shall solicit the views 
and preferences of the affected community on the 
remediation and disposition of hazardous 
substances, pollutants, or contaminants at the 
facility. [These] views and preferences ... shall 
be ... considered in the screening of remedial 
alternatives for the facility. 
This bi-directional information flow was emphasized within 
the revision's public meeting requirements, as well: 
(f} (1) (B) Public meetings shall be designed to 
obtain information from the community and 
disseminate information to the community 
concerning [USEPA's] facility activities and 
pending decisions. (US House of Representatives, 
1994) . 
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While the Senate bill, S. 1834, did not elaborate upon 
public participation in Superfund to the extent that the 
House bill did, its effect would have been substantially the 
same. Like the House version, it would have required USEPA 
to employ frequent public meetings and would have 
established Citizen Information and Access Offices. Also 
like the House version, and in contrast to current law, S . 
l834 would have required USEPA to consider the local 
community's views regarding the remediation of a Superfund 
site: 
TITLE I - COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND HUMAN HEALTH 
SEC. 101. PURPOSES AND ACTIVITIES 
(f) EARLY, DIRECT AND MEANINGFUL COMMUNITY 
INVOLVEMENT . .. [USEPA] shall consider the views, 
preferences and recommendations of the affected 
community regarding all aspects of the response 
activities ... 
(h) PROCESS FOR INVOLVEMENT.- As early as 
practicable after site discovery, [USEPA] shall 
provide regular, direct and meaningful community 
involvement in all phases of response activities 
at the facility ... 
(2) ... The community's views and preferences shall 
be ... considered in the development of remedial 
alternatives for the facility (US Senate 1994). 
Like H. 3800, S. 1834 would have expanded the uses to which 
the TAG grants could be put; one such use might be to 
"facilitate public participation in the selection of 
remedial action at the [Superfund] facility" (US Senate 
1994) . 
The language of both House and Senate versions of the 
reauthorization of CERCLA would have required USEPA to 
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involve the public to an unprecedented degree in Superfund 
decision-making, from the very outset of a project. 
clearly, an intent of these changes was to avert the 
political consequences of such unpopular Superfund response 
decisions as USEPA's 1990 ROD, which called for the 
incineration of New Bedford Harbor's contaminated sediments. 
The future of this policy shift toward the greater 
involvement of local citizens in Superfund decision-making 
is now uncertain. 
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I. D. 4. The Greater New Bedford Community Work Group. 
Beginning in 1983, USEPA attempted to maintain a degree 
of public involvement in decisionmaking at the New Bedford 
Harbor Superfund Site by means of public informational 
meetings, pamphlets distributed in schools, and several 
public comment periods. In 1987, at the request of USEPA, 
the Mayor of New Bedford, John Bullard, appointed the 
Greater New Bedford Community Work Group (GNBCWG) to 
represent community interests to USEPA. The Work Group 
settled in at about ten active members representing a 
variety of community interests- (USEPA 1990) . 
In 1989, as USEPA's plan to dredge and incinerate the 
Acushnet's most contaminated sediments became public, the 
Agency awarded GNBCWG a $50,000 TAG. The purpose of this 
grant was to allow the citizens' group "to conduct an 
independent analysis of EPA's site investigation findings 
and evalution of cleanup options" (USEPA 1992a) . In 1990 
the Group voted on USEPA's 'Hot Spot Proposed Plan as part of 
the public comment process, voting six to three in favor of 
the incineration-dependent preferred alternative (USEPA 
1990c) . In 1991 the original GNBCWG disbanded; it was re-
formed with new members in 1992, and disbanded again in 1993 
(Duckworth 1993). With its 1990 vote, however, it had given 
USEPA the trappings of public approval for incineration of 
the New Bedford Harbor sediments. In reality, USEPA's 
incineration decision was extremely controversial. 
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I. o. S. Conflict over remediation. 
While the "official" public group involved in the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, the GNBCWG, was ratifying 
USEPA'S decision to incinerate the Hot Spot sediments, 
public opposition to the incineration was coalescing on a 
variety of levels. In the early 1990's, three citizens' 
groups formed to oppose USEPA's incineration plans: Hands 
Across the River (HATR); the Downwind Coalition (DC); and 
concerned Parents of Fair Haven (CPFH) . These groups 
organized demonstrations and lobbied municipal, State, and 
Federal representatives to block USEPA's plan, enlisting the 
aid of national anti-incineration groups such as Greenpeace 
and the Citizens' Clearing House for Hazardous Waste (Starr, 
1993) 50 • Inspired, perhaps, by the recently released United 
Church of Christ report (1987) showing a nationwide racial 
bias in the location of hazardous waste sites, the groups 
charged that USEPA's decision was colored by "environmental 
racism" toward the poor, largely ethnic community of the 
North End of New Bedford. Their claim was bolstered by the 
fact that a USEPA decision to incinerate PCBs at the 
Massachusetts Military Reservation had been recently 
defeated by public opposition in the nearby suburban 
community of Bourne, Massachusetts (Allen 1992b). 
50Th C' ' e it1zen' s 
established by the 
movement. 
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste was 
citizen-organizers of the Love Canal 
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opposition to USEPA's incineration plans appears to 
have been broad-based and to have been shared by some 
members of New Bedford's City Council. In 1991, the City 
council held a non-binding referendum to gauge public 
opinion of USEPA's plan, in which two-thirds of participants 
voted against incineration. However, the wording of the 
ballot did not explain that the incineration was just one 
component of a broad clean-up plan for the harbor, nor that 
the installation of the incinerator would be temporary; it 
is therefore impossible to determine to what extent citizens 
were rejecting USEPA's cleanup.plans, specifically, versus 
the general idea of waste incineration in New Bedford (Allen 
1992a; Sebastian 1993). 
In spite of the apparent groundswell of public 
opposition to incineration, USEPA moved toward 
implementation of the project in accordance with the 1990 
ROD. By mid-1993, well behind schedule, the Agency's 
contractor, Perland Environmental Technologies, began 
assembling the wastewater treatment component of the 
remediation system. On July 15, the New Bedford City 
Council unanimously passed an ordinance banning the 
transportation of "devices or mechanisms of any kind used in 
incineration or water treatment through the streets or 
airspace of the city without first obtaining a permit from 
the mayor and city council" (New Bedford City Council 1993) 
The action catapulted the issue into the front pages of the 
New Bedford Standard-Times and prompted USEPA to file suit 
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for civil penalties ($25,000 per day, the maximum provided 
for by CERCLA) and injunctive relief from the ordinance in 
federal District Court, Boston. On September 29, 1993, 
Judge William G. Young enjoined New Bedford from enforcing 
its ordinance against USEPA, and enjoined the City from 
"obstructing, impeding or otherwise interfering with entry 
and access by the Environmental Protection Agency [and] the 
u.s. Army Corps of Engineers ... to the Hot Spot Operable Unit 
of the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site" The Agency 
agreed to dismiss its claim for civil penalties when New 
Bedford agreed to allow USEPA full access to the site 
(United States of America v. City of New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, 1993). 
The Agency's legal success in enforcing its 
incineration decision seems to have been matched by 
political failure. Members of the City Council and of the 
activists' groups convinced State and Federal lawmakers to 
join them in opposing incineration . . US Senators John Kerry 
and Edward Kennedy and US Congressman Barney Frank lobbied 
Carol Browner, the newly appointed Administrator of USEPA, 
to consider alternative technologies for the cleanup 
(Collins 1993; Shaw 1994) . Frank also lobbied the White 
House, involving the General Accounting Office as well as 
Leon Panetta, President Clinton's budget director (Glass and 
Corey 1993). 
The way had been cleared, legally, for USEPA Region I 
to continue with its incineration plans. However, the 
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regional office was strongly encouraged behind the scenes, 
by the Administrator as well as by Judge Young, to attempt 
to settle the dispute through mediation (Garmon 1994; Shaw 
1994). The Agency enlisted the help of the Massachusetts 
Office of Dispute Resolution, which had recently mediated 
negotiations at New Bedford's other Superfund site, the 
Sullivan's Ledge landfill (Massachusetts Office of Dispute 
Resolution 1993). 
The Off ice of Dispute Resolution (ODR) was established 
in 1990 by the State General Assembly "to assist agencies 
and officers of the executive, . legislative, and judicial 
branches of the commonwealth, as well as any city or town to 
improve the resolution of disputes that arise within their 
respective jurisdictions" (M . G. L . 1993, Ch. 7, Sec. 51). 
The Off ice set about assembling a group of stakeholders and 
professionals which would become known as the New Bedford 
Harbor Superfund Site Committee. Committee members were 
selected using a consensual, inclusive approach, in an 
attempt to represent as many stakeholders as possible. 
The three ad-hoc citizens' groups are each represented: 
Hands Across the River; Concerned Parents of Fairhaven; and 
the Downwind Coalition. Legal, technical, and managerial 
representatives of USEPA sit across the table from the 
citizen representatives, as do representatives of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP) , the Federal and State natural resource trustees for 
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the site, respectively. Elected officials and municipal 
representatives include three New Bedford City Councillors; 
state senator Mark Montigny and State Representative William 
Straus; and representatives of Fair Haven, Acushnet, and the 
New Bedford Mayor's Office. Meetings are public, but 
participation is generally limited to committee members. 
The discussions are chaired by Michael Keating, a Providence 
lawyer and expert on alternative dispute resolution who was 
selected by the participants to serve as an impartial 
facilitator. Keating is assisted by one of ODR's 
staffmembers (Wells 1994). 
Roughly 20 people take part in each meeting; generally, 
the same individuals attend each meeting, so a rapport has 
developed. The discussions began with an expression of 
interests by each participant. Since then, the group has 
been reviewing alternatives to incineration for the 
remediation of the Hot Spot sediments, in hopes of 
developing a consensus regarding treatment of the 
contaminated sediments of the upper Acushnet River. The 
progress of the discussions led Frank Ciavattieri, head of 
USEPA Region I Waste Management Division, to announce on 12 
July 1994 that Region I had cancelled its contract with 
Perland Environmental Technologies to incinerate the Hot 
Spot sediments (Ciavettieri 1994). 
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II. The Problem 
II· A. Difficulty of siting noxious facilities. 
Much recent research has suggested that locational 
disputes over hazardous facilities result, in part, from 
differences in risk perception between the "risk 
professionals" who make siting decisions, and the public who 
must live in the shadow of such facilities (e.g., Cvetkovich 
and Earle, 1992; Slovic, 1987). Uncertainty is inherent to 
the science of risk assessment (Patton, 1993). To 
complicate matters in New Bedford's case, there is no "zero-
risk" option; the choice lies between the risks presumably 
inherent in the existing contamination in the waterway, 
versus a set of equally uncertain potential risks resulting 
from various cleanup options, such as incineration. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is an umbrella 
term which encompasses a variety of structured discussion 
techniques which have been used increasingly in recent years 
to attempt to resolve environmental disputes in a 
consensual, non-litigious manner (Fischer, 1993; Mosher, 
1983) . In the New Bedford case, ADR has taken the form of 
"facilitated discussions," coordinated by the Massachusetts 
Office of Dispute Resolution (ODR) . 
If, as the literature suggests, differences in risk 
perception between professionals and the public are a source 
of environmental disputes, then one definition of 
effectiveness in resolving such disputes would be the 
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reduction of such differences. The problem which this study 
examined, therefore, was whether ADR had, in this instance, 
reduced differences in risk perception between "risk 
managers"--environmental professionals--and "stakeholders"--
residents of the towns adjoining the Acushnet River. 
In order to measure perceptions of a variety of risk 
and trust issues related to the contamination of the 
Acushnet River, as well as USEPA's efforts to remediate this 
contamination, the study employed a descriptive survey. The 
data so gathered were compared among professionals and non-
professionals, involved and uninvolved in ODR's facilitated 
discussions, in order to discover whether the perceptions of 
the two camps within the discussions were closer than those 
without. Such a relationship would demonstrate the 
effectiveness of ODR's facilitated discussions. In 
addition, the survey examined public knowledge about the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site in order to shed light on the 
nature of the conflict, and to identify areas in which the 
dissemination of information to the public regarding the 
Site might have been improved. 
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II· B. Review of related literature. 
II. B. 1. Risk perception, assessment, and uncertainty. 
Human activities give rise to a broad and diverse range 
of technological hazards: from minor releases of pollutants 
to catastrophic nuclear and chemical plant accidents; from 
automobile accidents to the collapse of dams (Cutter 1993). 
"Risk" refers to the danger arising from hazards, 
incorporating the concept of probability (Lewis 1990) Or, 
as Mary Douglas (1990) has written, "[r]isk is unequivocally 
used to mean danger from future damage." Given adequate 
data, well-defined technological risks of relatively high 
probability, such as death by automobile accident, are 
easily quantified (though not necessarily without 
controversy) . Low-probability risks, or those which 
slightly elevate existing background risks, such as those 
attending the contamination of New Bedford Harbor or 
incineration of its sediments, are, conversely, extremely 
difficult to estimate, even if well-defined (Lewis 1990; 
Slovic 1987) . 
Quantitative risk assessment is fundamental to 
governmental environmental decisionmaking (Patton 1993; 
Russell and Gruber, 1987). In the case of carcinogenic and 
toxic chemicals, risk assessment uses extrapolations from 
animal data to attempt to estimate the average probability 
that a particular consequence will result from a given level 
of exposure to a particular substance. Probabilities so 
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obtained are used by USEPA as the foundation for risk 
management, the process by which the Agency decides whether 
and how a risk should be regulated or mitigated (Patton 
1993 ). While risk assessors work to err on the side of 
conservatism, the methodology of risk assessment necessarily 
employs a good deal of inference, extrapolation, and 
assumption, so that quantitative risk assessment is 
inherently uncertain (Patton 1993; Sheuplein 1993; Russell 
and Gruber 1987) . According to Freudenburg and Pastor 
(1992), "[q]uantitative estimates of overall risk are likely 
to involve the tyranny of illusory precision." Moreover, 
recent behavioral research has shown that expert risk 
assessments are built largely upon subjective judgements 
(Gardner and Gould, 1989). If one accepts these points of 
view, then, the truly objective risk quantification becomes 
an impossibility. 
To the extent that federal decisionmaking sees risk as 
something which can be accurately quantified, it takes a 
technical, or objectivist, view of risk. In contrast to 
this model is one proposed by researchers in the behavioral 
sciences, which might be referred to as the constructionist, 
or subjective, view. According to this view, risks and 
hazards are broad social phenomena, functions of collective 
actions and judgements with respect to the physical world. 
Within this paradigm, perception becomes more important than 
efforts at quantification (Cutter, 1993; Cvetkovich and 
Earle, 1992), while "risk" refers not just to chance of 
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death or loss of "statistical lives," but incorporates an 
array of undesirable effects (Gardner and Gould, 1989) . 
The study of risk perception originally concerned 
itself with natural hazards, but has since evolved to deal 
largely with technical ones. The work may be divided into 
two broad categories: that which utilizes a primarily 
psychological approach, and that which is essentially 
spatial. The former is characterized by emphasis on 
cognitive aspects of risk perception (often utilizing 
controlled experiments) while the latter is more 
functionally oriented, generally site-specific, and often 
concerned with the relationship between behavior and 
political or physical action (Cutter 1993). 
Starr (1969) was among the first to attempt to quantify 
public perception of technological risks, employing a 
"revealed preference" methodology to draw conclusions about 
the risks and benefits of technologies based upon historical 
data (Slavic 1987) . This approach was superceded by what 
Slovic refers to as the · "psychometric paradigm:" the use of 
"expressed preferences" or survey methodology to show that 
different groups perceive given risks in quantifiably 
different ways, and that, conversely, different risks can be 
distinguished by quantifiable characteristics using factor 
analysis (Slovic 1987) . 
In the groundbreaking Risk and Culture (1982), however, 
Douglas and Wildavsky offer a far more subjective view of 
risks and risk perception. Drawing on anthropology as well 
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as political theory, these authors argue that risks are 
"cultural constructs." That is, while risks are often real 
(though frequently hidden) , their perception and selection 
are functions of particular cultural biases. 
By 1990, Wildavsky and Dake could describe three major 
theories of risk perception prevalent in the social 
sciences. "Knowledge theory" posits the idea that people 
perceive risks because they actually know things to be 
dangerous. "Personality theory," conversely, proposes that 
risk perception is a function of one's personality, while 
"economic theory" sees a personal cost-benefit calculus 
driving risk perception. These researchers conclude that 
personality variables tend to be the best predictor of 
attitudes toward environmental risks. Similarly, Samdahl 
and Robertson (1989) examined the existing body of work as 
well as their own questionnaire, concluding that while 
socioeconomic variables are generally poor predictors of 
environmental concern, political ideology corresponded 
strongly with pro-environmental values. 
Other researchers have examined the psychological 
context of complex environmental decisionmaking, including 
that concerned with technological risk. A number of 
researchers have shown that, faced with a great deal of 
complicated information, individuals--experts included--
employ "cognitive oversimplification" or heuristic methods 
to arrive at a decision (Miller 1985, Varis 1989). Miller 
(l985) shows that such simplification inevitably results in 
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decisionmaking bias, distinguishing between "cognitive 
bias"--that which results from the simple inability to 
incorporate all relevant factors into a decision--and 
"motivational bias"--that which is driven by ulterior 
motives. 
In contrast to these psychological approaches to the 
study of risk perception, geographers have taken a more 
functional or contextually-oriented approach, examining the 
factors influencing individual or group response to actual 
situations (Cutter, 1993). Furuseth (1990), for example, 
has explored spatial aspects of citizen response to the 
siting of a sanitary landfill in North Carolina, one of a 
number of investigations into the dimensions of the NIMBY 
(Not In My Backyard) phenomenom. This study found that, 
while a spatial dimension to citizens' objections to the 
siting did exist, it was by no means the only important 
predictor of response. Hatfield (1989) compared groups 
involved in the siting of a hazardous waste incinerator in 
Southern California, using factor analysis to examine how 
attitudes toward specific siting variables differed among 
groups. Interestingly, he found survey respondents who 
attended public meetings on the issue to be significantly 
more risk-averse than respondents contacted by mail. 
Several researchers have used survey-based risk 
perception studies to attempt to weigh perceived costs and 
benefits of technologies. Cutter (1984) used a series of 
questionnaires to examine public assessment of risks and 
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benefits of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, while 
Gardner and Gould (1989) compared residents of Arizona and 
Connecticut with respect to perceived risks, benefits, and 
acceptability of several technologies. 
II. B. 2. The nature of locational disputes: Differences in 
perception; NIMBY and LULU. 
Much recent work has shown that differences in risk 
perception between professionals and laypeople are a primary 
source of conflicts over environmental technology (e.g. Fort 
et al. 1993; Cvetkovich and Earle 1992; Gardner and Gould 
1989; Slovic 1987; Miller 1984). Miller (1984) has shown 
that this disparity results, in part, from inherent biases 
held by experts and laypeople, including biases resulting 
from media coverage and attitudes of distrust toward certain 
categories of individuals, such as representatives of 
government. Moreover, the two groups may define "risk" in 
this context in entirely different ways (Slovic, 1987). 
Professional environmental managers tend to define risk in 
terms of probability of death or injury while laypeople 
employ a broader calculus, taking into account more 
qualitative factors. These include the existence of 
disagreement among experts; the degree of equity with which 
risks are borne (Gardner and Gould 1989); effects upon 
property values (Cvetkovich and Earle 1992); and the degree 
of public control over the selection of risks (Fiorino 
1989). 
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Two acronyms have come to describe local public 
resistance to the siting of technological facilities: 1 NIMBY 
(Not rn My Back Yard) and LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) 
The two terms regard the same phenomenom from slightly 
different perspectives. Those who use NIMBY "tend to see 
only the location, not the technology, as problematic," 
while users of the term LULU implicitly acknowledge that 
certain types of facilities are likely to meet with public 
opposition regardless of their proposed location 
(Freudenburg and Pastor 1992). Hazardous waste treatment 
facilities are among the least . wanted (Popper 1981). Popper 
has argued that LULUs are an unavoidable fact of land-use 
planning, but that a variety of tactics exist to increase 
community acceptance, such as on-site mitigation and good-
faith public involvement. Numerous studies have explored 
the idea of monetary compensation to communities in return 
for siting a LULU (e.g. Portney 1985; Fort et al. 1993). 
Other investigations have shown that . social distrust--lack 
of public confidence in government and/or industry--is often 
an important part of the conflict surrounding these LULUs 
(e.g. Cvetkovich and Earle 1992; Kasperson et al. 1992; 
Freudenburg and Pastor 1992). Freudenburg and Pastor argue 
that, to move toward the minimization of LULU controversies, 
research is needed which crosses the boundary between 
professionals and the public. They call for "more research 
I ~swell as other types of controversial facilities, such 
as prisons, homeless shelters, and sex-related businesses. 
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which is genuinely comparative -- treating as problematic 
not just the views of the general public, but of both the 
public and the technical community (1992) . 
II. B. 3. Public participation in environmental 
decisionmaking. 
A subtext of much recent risk perception literature--
particularly that written from the social science 
perspective--is the desirability of increasing local public 
involvement in environmental decisionmaking. Goals of 
increased participation include enhancing the acceptability 
of LULUs as well as the furthering of democratic ideals 
(Kasperson et al. 1992; Fiorino 1989; Kasperson 1986; 
Portney 1985) . Arnstein (1969) pointed out that there is a 
hierarchy of citizen involvement in government 
decisionmaking, ranging from the nominal ("tokenism") to the 
actual ("citizen power"). An objective of some risk 
perception studies has been to forge . a theoretical link 
between perception and participation, i.e., to explain 
citizen action (Cutter 1993). 
II. B. 4. Alternative dispute resolution. 
Clearly, a priori public involvement is more efficient 
than a protracted environmental dispute (which is not to 
suggest that either is inevitable, nor that the two are 
mutually exclusive). Once a dispute does occur, it may be 
resolved either by legal proceedings or by alternative 
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dispute resolution (ADR) . Cormick (1980) has argued that 
ADR requires and promotes the more developed model of 
citizen participation, that which empowers the public. 
While a number of authors have advocated the use of ADR for 
the resolution of environmental disputes (e.g. Fischer 1993; 
Mosher 1983), there have been relatively few attempts to 
critically assess the effectiveness of ADR (Nakamura et al. 
l991; Wells 1994). Nakamura et al. examined a failed effort 
at ADR concerning a Superfund Site in upstate New York, 
concluding that ADR must be properly managed in order to 
carry a high probability of success. 
II. B. S. Justice, equity, and public involvement under 
Superfund. 
A recent, yet growing, body of literature is concerned 
with "environmental equity:" the social justice aspect of 
environmental decisionmaking. A landmark study on this 
topic was that commissioned by the United Church of Christ 
(1987), which examined the relationship between ethnic and 
racial variables and the locations of hazardous waste sites 
and commercial hazardous waste treatment facilities 
nationwide. Controlling for socioeconomic variables, the 
study found high correlations between race and ethnicity and 
proximity to hazardous waste sites. Research by Hird (1993) 
agreed that Superfund sites are more likely to occur in 
communities with more non-white residents, but found a 
positive correlation between wealthier communities and the 
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frequency of hazardous waste sites. Hird's research found 
great variability in the cost-effectiveness of Superfund, 
concluding that costs per statistical life saved ranged from 
$34 0,000 to $77 billion. The limit of cost-effectiveness 
for environmental clean-ups is generally considered to be 
$l0 million per statistical life saved (Hird, 1993). 
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II· c. Significance of the study. 
The outcome of this research has significance for the 
pending reauthorization of Superfund's enabling legislation, 
the comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as amended by the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) . 2 
Arguably, CERCLA's weak requirements for public involvement 
in superfund decisionmaking are partly to blame for the 
magnitude of the current dispute. In an attempt to 
reconcile the opposing sides, the facilitated discussions 
chaired by the Massachusetts Off ice of Dispute Resolution 
(ODR) have involved the public to a much greater degree than 
required by CERCLA. If the discussions have indeed 
accomplished their purpose, a strong case could be made for 
expanding CERCLA's public involvement requirements when the 
law is reauthorized. Moreover, the revision might be worded 
so as to encourage the type of consensual process typified 
by ODR's facilitated discussions, rather than litigation, to 
resolve the public/governmental conflicts which inevitably 
arise under Superfund. A relevant question for CERCLA, 
therefore, is: have ODR's facilitated discussions been 
working? That is, have they caused the hazard perceptions 
of citizens and managers, regarding the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site and its remediation, to converge? 
242 U.S.C. Section 9601 et seq. 
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III. The method. 
III. A. Hypotheses. 
A 1 General Hypothesis. III· • · 
In general, the research hypothesized that a particular 
facilitated discussion had enhanced the potential for the 
resolution of a local/Federal conflict regarding a coastal 
superfund Site. Specifically, it was hypothesized that 
participation in ODR's facilitated discussions had reduced 
the differences in risk perception between the disputants in 
the case of the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. These 
disputants were characterized as follows: 
1. Those who opposed incineration: local citizens and 
their representatives--the three ad hoc environmental 
groups as well as local politicians . 
2. Those who favored incineration: Federal and State 
coastal resource managers--specifically, 
representatives of USEPA and DEP . 
III. A. 2. Study groups·. 
In order to test the general hypothesis at a discrete 
point in time, the two disputant groups were subdivided so 
that differences in risk perception between citizens and 
managers within ODR's discussions might be compared with 
differences in risk perception between citizens and managers 
uninvolved in the discussions. In other words, the 
following four sub-groups of stakeholders were regarded for 
analysis: 
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up 1: Citizens' representatives who participated in the 
Gro facilitated discussions chaired by ODR. 
Group 2: Citizens of the Greater New Bedford Metropolitan 
Area who had not participated in these facilitated 
discussions, represented by a random sample. 
Group 3: Coastal resource managers included in the 
facilitated discussions chaired by ODR. 
Group 4: Coastal resource managers who were uninvolved in 
these facilitated discussions, represented by a non-
random sample . 
III. A. 3. Assumptions. 
In order to establish the context of the hypothesis, 
the research employed the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1: It is assumed that the current perceptions of 
Group 2, regarding hazards associated with the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation, are 
statistically similar to the perceptions of Group 1 at 
the point at which these citizen representatives became 
involved in ODR's facilitated discussions. 
Assumption 2: It is assumed that the current perceptions of 
Group 4, regarding hazards associated with the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation, are 
statistically similar to the perceptions of Group 3 at 
the point at which these coastal resource managers 
became involved in ODR's facilitated discussions. 
III. A. 4. Major Hypothesis. 
It was hypothesized that the involvement of individuals 
in the series of facilitated discussions chaired by ODR 
reduced the differences in hazards perception between the 
two opposing sides in the dispute over the remediation of 
the the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
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III· A. s. Hypothetical model. 
The study's major hypothesis may be represented 
graphically by positioning the perceptions of the four study 
groups along a continuum, as follows. 
Citizens 
Point. of 
Theoretical 
Agreement 
Managers 
I------------I------------I-----------I--------------I 
Group 2 Group 1 Group 3 Group 4 
Initial 
citizens' 
perceptions 
Citizens' 
perceptions 
after facil'd 
discussion 
----------------->> 
Effect of facilitated 
discussions on public 
perception 
Managers' 
perceptions 
after facil'd 
discussion 
Initial 
managers' 
perceptions 
<<------------------
Effect of facilitated 
discussions on profess'! 
perception 
This model incorporates, implicitly, two hypothetical ideas: 
1) The difference in perception between Groups 1 and 3 
is smaller than the difference in direction between 
Groups 2 and 4. 
2) The two public groups (Groups 1 and 2) lie at one 
end of the continuum, while the professional groups (3 
and 4) lie at the other. 
In other words, while the facilitated discussion has brought 
the two sides closer together, it has not changed the 
direction of individuals' perceptions to any significant 
degree. That is, few if any individuals have switched sides 
in the debate as a result of participation in the 
facilitated discussions. 
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III· A. 6. Research hypotheses. 
The two-tailed null and research hypotheses may be 
expressed as follows: 
~= 
~: 
It is hypothesized that there are no statistically 
significant differences in the measured perceptions of 
the four groups, regarding the hazards associated with 
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
It is hypothesized that there are statistically 
significant differences in the measured perceptions of 
the four groups, regarding the hazards associated with 
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
The research hypothesis is in turn subdivided into three 
one-tailed sub-hypotheses, as follows: 
sub-hypothesis 1: It is hypothesized that the difference in 
perception between Group 1 and Group 3, regarding the 
hazards associated with the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site and its remediation, is, to a 
statistically significant degree, less than the 
difference in perceptions between Group 2 and Group 4. 
Sub-hypothesis 2: It is hypothesized that the difference in 
perception between Group 1 and Group 2, regarding the 
hazards associated with the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site and its remediation, is, to a 
statistically significant degree, less than the 
difference in perceptions between Group 1 and Group 4. 
Sub-hypothesis 3: It is hypothesized ·that the difference in 
perception between Group 3 and Group 4, regarding the 
hazards associated with the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site and its remediation, is, to a 
statistically significant degree, less than the 
differences in perception between Group 3 and Group 2. 
The three sub-hypotheses may be graphically represented in 
relation to the main hypothesis as follows: 
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I------------I------------I-----------I--------------I 
Group 2 Group 1 Group 3 Group 4 
sub-hypothesis 1: ( I Gl - G3 I ) < ( I G2 - G4 l ) 
<----------------
<---
G2 - G4 
Gl - G3 
--------------------> 
-----> 
sub-hypothesis 2: ( I Gl - G2 I ) < ( I Gl - G4 I ) 
<- IG1-G2 I -><---------- I Gl - G4 I -------------> 
Sub-hypothesis 3: 
<-----------
Where Gl - G2 
(I G3-G4 I) < (I G3 - G2) 
I G3 - G4 ----------><- IG3 - G21 -> 
the difference in perception 
between Group 1 and Group 2, etc. 
In practice, statistical testing of survey results needed to 
be undertaken only where the general order of the expected 
relationship was initially apparent, based on margin totals 
of the results. In other words, a simple examination of the 
margin totals (mean by group for Likert-scale questions; 
percent frequency by group for frequency-based questions) 
showed whether the position of each group along the 
perceptual continuum was the same as that of the 
hypothetical model, for a given survey question . Where the 
expected relationship was not so apparent, Hr could be 
rejected without statistical testing. Where the general 
order of the hypothetical model was apparent, statistical 
testing for differences among groups was undertaken, in 
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order to determine whether the differences among groups were 
statistically significant . 
statistical results which supported the existence of 
the hypothesized model would suggest that the process of 
dispute resoloution had, in this particular case, moved 
opposing sides toward compromise. If, however, statistical 
testing resulted in the acceptance of the null hypothesis, 
concerns would be raised regarding the possible failure of 
the process of dispute resolution. Faced with such an 
outcome, the study would be forced to ask, what do the 
survey data tell us about the nature of the dispute and its 
reconciliation, in the context of public perception of the 
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site? 
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III· B. Study area and sample population. 
The delineation of a study area for a project such as 
this was necessarily somewhat arbitrary, since 
decisionmaking affecting the New Bedford Superfund Site 
occurs as far away as Boston and Washington and as near as 
the nearest resident--a mere stone's throw from the Hot 
spot. 
In the case of Groups 1 and 3--participants in ODR's 
facilitated discussions--there was no choice in the matter 
if the sample were to be comprehensive. In fact, most of 
the citizen representatives (Group 1) reside in the same 
three-town area as the public random sample (Group 2); 
several live in the surrounding towns: Dartmouth, 
Mattapoisett, or Marion, Massachusetts. Most of the 
professional participants (Group 3) work in Boston. 
In the case of Group 4--professionals uninvolved in 
ODR's discussions--the study attempted to define the sample 
which was a) most nearly comparable to Group 3, and b) most 
likely to be generally familiar with the New Bedford Harbor 
site: marine resource professionals working in the 
Southeastern Massachusetts region. 
Group 2--the public random sample--was by far the 
largest of the four study groups. The three Massachusetts 
towns of New Bedford, Fair Haven, and Acushnet were chosen 
as the study area for this group because they adjoin the 
Acushnet River; thus all are directly affected by the 
contamination of the river and by the Superfund cleanup. 
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Moreover, they were the three towns best represented on the 
facilitated discussions, and the only towns formally 
represented thereon. The choice of this area allowed Group 
2 to be as nearly comparable, geographically, to Group 1 as 
possible. Sample size for Group 2 was determined on a 
strictly pragmatic basis--it was as large as was feasible 
with the resources available at the time. 
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III· c. survey design. 
Two forty-question survey instruments were used in the 
study: one for the two public groups (Groups 1 and 2) and 
one for the two professional groups (3 and 4). The two 
versions had different sets of introductory questions but 
shared thirty-three "core questions." Cover letters 
differed slightly among the groups. Appendix B includes 
complete survey texts: introductory questions, core 
questions, and sample cover letters. 
The most important step in designing the survey 
instrument was to determine the defining issues in the 
dispute between citizens and managers regarding the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. The primary source for this 
investigation was a videotape of the second of ODR's 
facilitated discussions, held on January 5, 1994, at the 
Greater New Bedford Vocational High School. At this 
meeting, each participant was asked by the facilitator to 
put forth their interests regarding the Superfund site. 
They were asked not to make position statements, but rather 
to state concerns with the course of the remediation process 
(City of New Bedford 1994) . 
The discussion participants cited a fairly broad range 
of concerns. At this time the most intense point of 
disagreement concerned the health risks associated with 
incineration of the Hot Spot sediments. Other areas of 
dispute included severity of ambient site risks; importance 
of expediting the clean-up; the validity of USEPA's past 
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public participation efforts; and the existence of bias in 
government decisionmaking. Summarized and organized, the 
discussion yielded fourteen major points of disagreement, 
which could be grouped under seven general headings. The 
results of this procedure are detailed in Appendix A. 
once identified, these issues became the basis for the 
study's questionnaire. The thirty-three "core questions" 
were designed to measure four broad categories of perception 
relevant to the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site: perceived 
risk of the existing contamination; perceived risk of 
USEPA's remediation plans; trust in the Government's ability 
to deal with the site; and the effectiveness of Government's 
communication about the site. As mentioned, the core 
questions were included the surveys administered to all four 
groups. Questions utilized Likert scales, rank-order 
questions, and forced-choice formats. 
In addition, two sets of seven introductory questions 
were created: one for the public survey administered to 
Groups 1 and 2; the other for the professional survey given 
to Groups 3 and 4. Introductory questions in the public 
survey sought to discern basic demographic variables, degree 
and sources of knowledge about the Site, and personal 
attitudes toward risk. Those in the professional version 
were intended to determine the managers' role in site 
management and general attitudes toward citizen involvement, 
as well as, again, personal attitudes toward risk. 
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A prototype of the public survey was pre-tested in New 
Bedford and Fairhaven on June 28 and 29, 1994. I knocked on 
the doors of six houses, chosen arbitrarily, introduced 
myself, and asked the residents to complete the survey. In 
half the cases I was able to sit and talk with the 
respondent while he or she filled out the survey; in all 
cases, I discussed it with them afterward. 
It was immediately apparent that there was a great deal 
of interest in the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site among 
local people; it seemed, therefore, that residents did not 
regard the ten-page survey to be as onerous as they 
otherwise might have. Generally, the pretest respondents 
seemed to find that the survey required some thought, but 
was not difficult, although they found some questions to be 
in need of clarification. These were revised in the 
subsequent, and final, version. 
An interesting, but unexpected, influence upon survey 
results came to light during these pretest discussions. 
During the spring and summer of 1994, the New England 
Fisheries Management Council and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service were implementing Amendment 5 of the 
Northeast Multispecies Management Plan--the "Groundfish 
Plan"--as well as Amendment 4, the "Scallop Plan." The 
provisions of these plans amounted to the most severe 
regulation ever placed upon New England fisheries, including 
strict limits on catch quantities and vessel-days-at-sea, as 
Well as stringent gear regulation. Many New England 
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fishermen were outraged. New Bedford fishermen brought 
their boats to Boston to protest the plans in February and 
March of 1994; many expressed a belief that the Government 
was trying to put them out of business (Pollack 1994a and 
1994b) . 
During the pretest, respondents with personal ties to 
the commercial fishing industry expressed great antipathy 
toward the Federal Government, which they perceived as 
foisting draconian regulations upon them. This sentiment 
clearly influenced attitudes toward Government decision-
making regarding the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. As 
a result of this discovery, the revised version of the 
survey included a question to establish how closely a 
respondent was connected with the scallop and groundfish 
industries, if at all. 
The public version of the survey was translated into 
Portuguese and Spanish by native speakers. By preparing 
surveys in these languages, in addition to English, the 
study ensured that the survey instrument would be 
intelligible to at least 93.3% of residents over five years 
of age within the study area (US Department of Commerce, 
1992b). During distribution of the surveys, those Spanish 
speakers encountered turned out to be equally comfortable 
with English or Portuguese; therefore, no Spanish surveys 
were administered. 
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III· D. Survey administration. 
III. D. 1. Discussion participants: Groups 1 and 3. 
Groups 1 and 3--citizens and professionals involved in 
ODR's facilitated discussions--were queried 
comprehensively. The Office of Dispute Resolution provided 
a list of forum participants and affiliations; based on 
group affiliations, participants were divided into citizen 
representatives versus professionals for study purposes. 
Facilitators were excluded from the study group, while 
elected officials were placed in Group 1. 
The discussion facilitators introduced me at one of the 
last of the forum's regular meetings, in July, 1994. I 
contacted each of the discussion participants soon 
thereafter, briefly describing the nature of the study, and 
asking them to complete a survey, with an assurance of 
confidentiality. I emphasized that I was looking for 
individual perceptions rather than official position 
statements. In all cas~s, the forum participants agreed to 
at least look at the survey, although some of the 
professionals expressed a concern that their responses would 
be kept truly confidential (one went so far as to say "I 
could lose my job over this"), while others communicated an 
initial unwillingness to separate their own ideas from that 
of their employer. Subjects were then mailed surveys 
(public or professional, as appropriate) along with a 
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personalized cover letter and return envelope. Survey 
response rates for Groups 1 and 3 were as follows: 
Table 3.1: Survey distribution and response: forum 
participants, Groups 1 and 3. 
Group Number of Number who Number of Response 
individuals agreed to surveys rate 
be surveyed returned 
Group 1 13 12 8 66.7% 
Group 3 11 11 9 81.8% 
The list of participants in the facilitated discussions when 
the surveys were administrated may be found in Appendix C. 
III. D. 2. Professional non-participants: Group 4. 
The study's Group 4 (marine resource managers 
uninvolved in ODR's facilitated discussions) was chosen in a 
non-random, non-comprehensive manner. Admittedly, this is a 
weak selection method in terms of· validity; however, it was 
the only practical way to assemble an adequate number of 
individuals with the required characteristics. Subjects for 
this segment of the study were choseri from my own 
acquaintances in the field of environmental management and 
these professionals' referrals. Criteria for selection were 
as follows: 
1. That the individual was involved in any aspect 
of environmental or coastal management on a 
professional level. 
2. That s/he was working in Massachusetts, and 
professed at least a general knowledge of the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
3. That s/he had at no time been an active 
participant in ODR's facilitated discussions . 
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In order to ensure that Group 4 was approximately the same 
size as Groups 1 and 3, nine individuals were contacted. 
Methodology from this point was essentially the same as for 
Groups 1 and 3: after outlining the purpose of the study, I 
asked whether they would be willing to participate. In most 
cases, they initially agreed. A copy of the professional 
version of the survey was then mailed to each, along with a 
personalized cover letter and return envelope. After 
reading the survey, one member of Group 4 declined to 
participate: an employee of NOAA, who simply said that he 
did not feel that his completion of the survey would be 
"appropriate." Distribution and returns were as follows: 
Table 3.2: Survey distribution and response: professionals 
uninvolved in forum, Group 4. 
Group # queried # agreed/ # returned Response 
distributed rate 
4 9 8 7 87.5% 
III. D. 3. Public random sample: Group 2. 
In order to query the non-aligned New Bedford area 
public (Group 2) I the public version of the survey was 
administered to a stratified random sample of residents of 
New Bedford, Fair Haven, and Acushnet from 6 - 27 July, 
1994. Using the approach described by West (1993), ten 
random traverses were laid across a map of the study area 
(Champion Map Corporation, 1990) . City blocks were selected 
at random intervals along these lines; rural areas were 
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excluded. The distribution and return of surveys to , and 
from, Group 2 is fully described by Table 3 . 3. 
Table 3.3: Distribution and return of surveys by town: Group 
2 . 
r- % # of # of % # Town Pop. tot. % 
tot. blcks surv # tot. ret'd tot. 
pop. sam'd /blk dist dist ret'd 
N.B. 99, 79.5 19 7 133 78.6 84 63 . 2% 
922 
Ac sh 9554 7 . 6 2 7 14 8.3 7 50% 
F.H. 16, 12.8 11 2 22 13.0 19 86.4% 
132 
TOT. 125, 99.9 33 169 99.9 110 65.1% 
608 
I administered the Group -2 surveys personally, going 
door to door, weekdays during evening hours; my method was 
adapted from that used by Fenton and Syme (1989) for a study 
of Australians' perceptions of the coastal zone. Beginning 
at the northeast corner of each selected block , I moved 
clockwise about the interior of the block, knocking on each 
door. If the necessary number of surveys could not be 
distributed within the interior of the block, I then moved 
about the exterior; if the quota still had not been reached, 
I moved one block northward to repeat the process. Where 
the Selected block was non-residential, I moved one block to 
the North, as many times as necessary to obtain a primarily 
residential block. In cases of mixed-use blocks, commercial 
establishments were omitted from the survey. Multi-story, 
multi-family dwellings--the tenements which comprise most of 
the housing within the study area--were approached at street 
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level only, for practical reasons, although upper-story 
residents were often present in the ground-floor apartments, 
in which case they were asked to participate. 
once someone answered a door, I introduced myself and 
asked whether an adult resident of that home was willing to 
complete a survey regarding "the contamination problem in 
the Acushnet River." In nearly all instances, residents 
were at least aware that such a condition existed. Of 211 
residents with whom I spoke, 169 (80%) agreed to complete 
the ten-page survey, confirming my initial impression of 
great local interest in this issue. If a resident wanted to 
discuss the Superfund Site with me, I would ask them to 
first complete the survey. Only one survey per household 
was distributed; residents were asked to be sure that only 
adults completed the survey. The survey, along with a self-
addressed stamped envelope, was left with residents who 
agreed to participate. As shown in Table 3.3, the overall 
response rate was approximately 65% . . 
If the resident expressed an unwillingness to 
participate, I would gently try to persuade them; if they 
were at all adamant, I did not persist. In perhaps half of 
the cases where a resident initially refused participation, 
I was able to convince them to complete a survey. 
Unfortunately, in a few cases where passions ran highest, I 
was unable to elicit cooperation. One elderly gentleman 
said: "I was a foreman at Cornell, and I know too much about 
what went on there to answer your survey!" Another said, "I 
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worked at Aerovox for thirty-five years; they took 
bloodtests for that health study and found nothing wrong 
with me. I ' ve done my part." Try though I might, I could 
convince neither to participate; this was a loss to the 
study, since the capacitor manufacturers for whom both men 
worked are considered to be the among the principal sources 
of the PCB contamination of New Bedford Harbor. 
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IV. Analysis 
IV· A. Description of sample by group. 
As explained in Chapter III, the study's survey was 
distributed to four groups: 
Group 1: Citizens' representatives who had participated 
in the facilitated discussions chaired by the 
Massachusetts Off ice of Dispute Resolution (ODR) . 
citizen-participants were queried comprehensively. 
Group 2: Citizens of the Greater New Bedford Metropolitan 
Area who had not participated in these facilitated 
discussions, selected by means of a stratified random 
sample of New Bedford, Fair Haven and Acushnet 
residents. 
Group 3: Coastal resource managers who had been involved in 
the facilitated discussions. Manager-participants 
were, like Group 1, queried comprehensively. 
Group 4: Coastal resource managers who had not been 
involved in these facilitated discussions, represented 
by a non-random sample. 
Distribution and return of surveys by group are summarized 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Distribution and return of surveys by group. 
Tot. # Dist'd. Response Rate N for analysis 
Group 1 12 66.7% 8 
Group 2 169 65.1% 110 
Group 3 11 81.8% 9 
Group 4 8 87.5% 7 
TOTAL 200 67.0% 134 
Responses to the initial, descriptive section of the survey 
(Questions 1-7, which differed for citizens and 
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professionals), may be used to infer some general 
characteristics of each study group: 
Group 1: All respondents in Group 1 were long-term 
residents of the New Bedford area (minimum area residency 24 
years) . Of the 75% of this group who chose to describe 
their employment, all reported white-collar employment; 
none, however, had worked for any of the potentially 
responsible parties (PRPs: the capacitor manufacturers 
responsible for contamination of the harbor) . All reported 
having known of the pollution problem for at least three 
years. The responses of this group do not suggest a single 
most important source of information "concerning local 
events and controversies" (Question 7, public survey); 
however, television (including local-access cable), 
newspaper, conversation and town meetings are each seen as 
important by at least three-quarters of Group 1. This 
suggests a group of individuals who are well-informed, 
obtaining information through a variety of sources. 
Group 2: Group 2 reported residency in the New Bedford area 
ranging from one-half year to 84 years, with a mean 
residency of approximately 38 years. Slightly more than 76% 
of this Group reported having known of the harbor 
contamination for three years or more . Of those who chose 
to report employment status, 36% were not employed, 61% were 
employed by non-PRPs, and only 2.7% (2) reported employment 
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by PRPS. Those who further described their employment were 
about evenly divided between blue and white-collar workers. 
Again, no single source of information "concerning local 
events and controversies" seemed most important: radio, 
television, and newspapers were all rated highly by this 
group. Predictably, in comparison with Group 1, far fewer 
Group 2 respondents considered public meetings to be an 
important source of information: 14.3% as opposed to 87.5% 
among Group 1. 
Group 3: Not a single Group 3 . respondent was a resident of 
the New Bedford area. Reported period of involvement in 
environmental management ranged from 2 to 26 years, with a 
mean of approximately 13.4 years. When these individuals 
were asked how often they interacted with non-professionals 
during the course of their work, responses showed no 
clustering, ranging from "at least once a day" to a minimum 
of "once a month" or "varies too much to say." Asked to 
describe their role in site management, over half of these 
professionals (62.5%) considered their primary role a 
managerial one; l~ss than a third (28.5%) rated the 
technical component of their work most important. None of 
the Group 3 managers considered "public information" to be 
the most important aspect of their work. Asked by means of 
a Likert scale whether public involvement in governmental 
environmental decisionmaking was, generally, "a help or a 
hindrance" (Question 6, professional survey), Group 3 
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ressed cautious faith in citizen participation, favoring exp 
public involvement (mean response 7.33). Asked whether 
public involvement should be expanded within CERCLA's 
reauthorization {Question 7, professional survey), these 
managers were, again, cautiously positive (mean response 
7 .44). 
Group 4: Only one of the seven Group 4 managers queried 
(approximately 14%) had resided in the study area. Period 
of involvement in environmental management showed a range 
similar to that of Group 3 (5 to 33 years) and a similar 
mean (12.0 years). In contrast to the professionals of 
Group 3, almost half (42.9%) of the Group 4 professionals 
reported being in contact with the public "at least once a 
day." Also unlike Group 3, over half the Group 4 
professionals rated the technical component of their work 
most important (57.1%); only one of the seven considered 
their managerial function most important (14.3%), while one 
other (14.3%) considered his or her public information 
capacity most important . Regarding the efficacy of public 
involvement in environmental decisionmaking (Question 6, 
professional survey), Group 4 agreed, essentially, with 
Group 3 (mean response 7 . 71); they were slightly less keen 
than Group 3, however, on the desirability of expanding 
public involvement in Superfund (mean response 6.83). 
91 
IV· B. Analytical approach. 
B 1 General methodology. IV· · · 
Results of each of the survey's thirty-three "core 
questions" {Questions 8-40, those which were administered to 
all four study groups) were examined in order to ascertain 
whether the hypothesized relationship was present. The 
reader will remember that the study's hypothetical model was 
one where: 
1. The difference in perception between those groups 
which had participated in the facilitated 
discussions (Groups 1 and 3) was smaller than the 
difference between those which had not (Groups 2 
and 4), but 
2. Direction of differences separating citizens from 
managers remained constant; that is, the 
perceptions of the citizens (Groups 1 and 2) 
occupied one end of a continuum, while those of 
the managers (Groups 3 and 4) occupied the other. 
This hypothetical relationship is diagrammed, once again, 
below. 
Citizens 
Point of 
·Theoretical 
Agreement 
Managers 
I------------I------------I-----------I--------------I 
Group 2 Group 1 Group 3 Group 4 
The results of each of the survey's 33 "core questions" were 
tested for the existence of this hypothetical relationship 
in two steps: 
1. Tabulation of means and frequencies, using the SAS 
statistical package, and examination of these 
totals to determine whether the general 
relationship diagrammed above was apparent. 
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2. Where the expected relationship was generally 
evident, statistical testing was undertaken in 
order to determine whether differences among 
groups were statistically significant. 
In other words, if the graphic relationship expressed in the 
study's hypothetical model was initially discernable, and 
there were significant differences among the study groups, 
then the research hypothesis was accepted, and the null 
rejected. Where the graphic relationship of the 
hypothetical model was not evident, then, the null 
hypothesis could be accepted, and the research hypothesis 
rejected; questions which fell into this category were not 
initially examined for statistical significance. 
IV. B. 2. Statistical approach: Likert-scale questions. 
In keeping with the methodology explained above, the 
first step involved a simple examination of the means of the 
Likert score by group for each question . Where the 
hypothetical relationship was initially apparent, the 
Student-t test was used to test for significant differences 
among group means. 
Since Group 2's mean dominated the study's universal 
mean by virtue of Group 2's proportionally large n (n2 = 110 
while N = 134), the three smaller groups were tested for 
divergence from the universal mean, µ. Strictly speaking, 
the existence of statistically significant differences 
between each of the smaller groups and µ would not imply 
d ' f i ferences among the smaller groups (e . g., between 3 and 
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4) . However, in the context of the limitations imposed by 
the differences in size among the study groups, the 
relationship between µ and the three smaller groups (Groups 
1 , 3 , and 4) was taken to be an indicator that the 
hypothetical relationship was present in some form. 
conversely, the lack of such significant differences allowed 
the research hypothesis to be rejected, and the null 
accepted. 
The formula for the Student t Test is as follows: 
Where: 
t 
Xme 
µ 
std 
n = 
df = 
xme-µ 
t=-----
std/Jn-l 
student t statistic. 
Mean for sample group (Group 1, 3, or 
Mean for all groups, combined. 
Standard deviation of sample group. 
Size of sample group. 
degrees of freedom = n - 1 
4) . 
(West 1993) 
Blalock's (1979) table for the distribution of t in a two -
tailed test was used to determine whether or not differences 
among groups were statistically significant at the 95th 
percentile, i.e. a s .OS. 
IV. B. 3. Statistical approach: Frequency-based responses. 
The first step of hypothesis testing of the survey's 
checklist and rank-order responses, like that for the 
Likert-scale questions, involved simply examining the margin 
totals for each checklist or rank-order sub-question in 
order to determine whether the general hypothetical 
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relationship was apparent. Where it was, statistical 
analysis of both these types of questions focused upon 
categorical frequencies. In the case of checklist 
questions, responses for each group were divided into two 
sub-groups based upon whether the respondent had checked a 
particular line (considered a "yes" response) or not 
(considered a "no"); non-respondents were omitted from 
analysis. For rank-order questions, the number of 
respondents who had assigned a specific rank to a particular 
sub-question was measured against those who had not. 
Following Siegel and Castellan (1988), the Chi-Square 
(X2 ) test, corrected for continuity with the data cast into 
a 2x2 contingency table, was used to test for differences 
among groups. Again, the considerably larger n of Group 2 
required an asymmetrical approach to the testing. Response 
frequencies for each of the smaller groups were tested 
against those of the largest group (Group 2). Again, the 
existence of significant differences between each of the 
three smaller groups, an~ the larger group, was used as a 
general indicator, while the lack of such differences was 
considered to be evidence for acceptance of the null 
hypothesis. The mean was disregarded for this set of 
analyses. 
The contingency table used for analysis is presented in 
Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.~: Contingency table for X2 analysis of response 
frequencies. 
Group 1, 3, or 4 Group 2 
Frequency "no" Cell "A" Cell "B" 
Frequency "yes" Cell "C" Cell "D" 
The formula for the X2 test corrected for continuity is as 
follows: 
x2= n(IAD-BCl-n/2) 2 
(A+B) (C+D) (A+C) (B+D) 
where 
xz = chi-square statistic 
N 
A, 
df 
= total sample (both groups) 
B, C, D = respective cell values 
= degrees of freedom = 1 
(Siegel and Castellan 1988) 
Siegel and Castellan's (1988) X2 table was used to determine 
significance. Again, differences were considered 
statistically significant at the 95th percentile (a s .OS); 
a chi-square statistic of 3.84 or greater was considered 
indicative of this level of significance (Siegel and 
Castellan 1988). Siegel and Castellan suggest that sparsity 
rules only apply to a chi-square analysis where df > l; 
therefore, the study treated zero values like any other for 
purposes of analysis by means of the chi-square corrected 
for continuity. 
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IV· c. Analysis. 
c 1 Analysis of Likert-scale responses. IV. • • 
The hypothesized relationship was graphically apparent 
in only one of the study's Likert - scale questions: Question 
Therefore, this was the only question where the Student-8. 
t Test was used for hypothesis testing. 
Question 8: Respondents were asked to what extent they 
thought the existing contamination of the Acushnet River was 
a health risk. Possible Likert-scale responses ranged from 
o, "No current health risk," to 10, "Great current health 
risk." A score of 5 was marked "Moderate health risk." 
Results and analysis are summarized in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Survey Question 8 -- Analysis of results. 
Mean, std n or N t SS @ 
xme or µ ot = .05? 
Group 1 8.375 1 . 847 8 0.851 no 
Group 2 7.561 2.250 82 - - - - - -
Group 3 8.375 1.188 8 1.323 no 
Group 4 9.000 1.826 7 1. 635 no 
All 7.781 2.157 105 - - - - - -
Since analysis did not suggest the existence of 
statistically significant differences (SSDs) among groups, 
the research hypothesis was rejected and the null accepted 
for Question 8. Since this was the only one of the study's 
Likert-scale questions which showed the hypothesized 
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relationship graphically, the research hypothesis could be 
rejected for all the survey's Likert-scale questions. 
IV· c. 2. Analysis of frequency-based responses. 
Examination of the survey's rank-order and checklist 
responses revealed that, as in the case of the Likert-scale 
responses, the hypothesized perceptual convergence of Groups 
1 and 3 was not generally apparent. The response to only 
one checklist sub-question appeared to exhibit the 
hypothesized relationship; this was analyzed by means of the 
x2 test corrected for continuity. 
Question 9f: Question 9 asked respondents to identify those 
groups whom they considered to be "at risk" from the 
contamination at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. The 
question made use of a checklist describing fourteen 
different groupings of people, categorized primarily on the 
basis of age, race, and geography. The only one of these 
fourteen sub-questions where the hypothesized relationship 
was apparent was 9f, which listed "People who use boats." A 
summary of results and analysis, using the X2 test to 
compare Groups 1, 3, and 4 with Group 2, is presented in 
Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Question 9£ -- Analysis of results. 
Freq Freq. % Group Anal. xz SS @ 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat CX=.05 
Groupl 4 4 50.0% 8 92 0.03 no 
1 
Group2 45 39 46.4% 84 - - - - - -
Group3 3 6 33.3% 9 93 0.65 no 
Group4 1 6 14.3% 7 91 2.57 no 
All - - - - - - 108 - - - - - -
on the basis of the chi-square test corrected for 
continuity, the research hypothesis was rejected and the 
null accepted for Question 9f. 
IV. c. 3. Rejection of major hypothesis. 
The study's hypothetical relationship was graphically 
apparent in the results of only two of the survey's 
questions; therefore only these two (Questions 8 and 9f) 
were tested statistically. In neither case did statistical 
testing support Hr, which hypothesized the existence of 
statistically significant differences among groups. The 
research, therefore, rejected the major hypothesis, and in 
so doing, accepted the null. Participation in the 
facilitated discussions chaired by the Massachusetts Off ice 
of Dispute Resolution does not appear to have caused the 
risk perceptions of citizens and managers, regarding the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, to converge. 
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IV· D. An emergent relationship: Polarization. 
Examination of survey response margin totals exposed a 
relationship which appeared to be far more prevalent than 
the hypothesized one. This relationship may be described as 
polarization of perception, and is in fact nearly the 
opposite of the hypothetical relationship. Polarization of 
perception may be said to be present where Group 1 and Group 
3 , the facilitated discussion participants, are statistical 
outliers at either end of the study's perceptual continuum. 
schematically, this relationship may be represented as 
follows: 
Xme' Group 1 Universal mean, µ 
or Group 2 
Xme' Group 3 
I------ S S D -------!------- S S D ---------! 
The null and research hypotheses may be stated as 
follows: 
H0 : It is hypothesized that there are no statistically 
significant differences in the measured perceptions of 
the three groups, regarding the hazards associated with 
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
~: It is hypothesized that there are statistically 
significant differences in the measured perceptions of 
the three groups, regarding the hazards associated with 
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
The sub-hypotheses used to test for polarization were as 
follows: 
Sub-hYPothesis 1: It is hypothesized that the perceptions 
of Group 1 and Group 3, regarding the hazards 
associated with the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site 
and its remediation, lie at either extreme of the 
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perceptual continuum formed by the perceptions of all 
four groups. 
sub-hypothesis 2: It is hypothesized that the perceptions 
of Group 1, regarding the hazards associated with the 
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation, 
are different, to a statistically significant degree , 
from those of Group 2 (for frequency-based questions), 
or from the universal mean, µ (for Likert-scale 
questions) . 
Sub-hypothesis 3: It is hypothesized that the perceptions 
of Group 3, regarding the hazards associated with the 
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation, 
are different, to a statistically significant degree, 
from those of Group 2 (for frequency-based questions), 
or from the universal mean, µ (for Likert-scale 
questions) . 
It will be noted that, again, µ and Group 2 were treated as, 
if not the same, similar for purposes of analysis, since the 
proportionally large n of Group 2 caused it to dominate the 
study's statistical universe . 
The method for testing the polarization hypothesis was 
similar to that used to test the major hypothesis . Again, 
in order to validate the model, the research first examined 
margin totals for the existence of the general polarized 
relationship. Where thi~ relationship was graphically 
apparent, statistical testing was undertaken to test for 
significant differences. Acceptance of the research 
hypothesis required SSDs between Group 1 and the mean (or 
its proxy, Group 2), as well as between Group 3 and the mean 
(or, again, Group 2). Though Group 4 was tested along with 
the other groups, its statistical status was in fact 
irrelevant to the search for polarization. 
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of the three types of questions (Likert, checklist, and 
rank-order) used in the survey's "core" section, 
approximately 33% of Likert-scale questions (7 of 21) , 24% 
of checklist sub-questions (9 of 38), and none of the rank-
order sub-questions showed the general polarization 
relationship. Again, the Student-t Test was used to analyze 
the results of the Likert-scale questions; the three smaller 
groups were each tested for significant differences against 
the universal mean, µ, dominated by Group 2. If Group 1 and 
Group 3 each showed statistically significant differences 
from µ, then the model was considered validated, and Hr was 
accepted. 
Once again, frequency-based questions (rank-order and 
checklist) were tested by means of the Chi-square test 
corrected for continuity. Each of the three smaller groups 
was compared, statistically, with Group 2; where Group 1 and 
3 were both found to be statistically different from Group 
2, ~ was, again, accepted. 
IV. D. 1. Analysis of Likert-scale responses: Polarization. 
Question 13: Question 13 asked respondents to what extent 
they thought the government's scientists actually knew about 
the health risks related to the existing harbor 
contamination. O on the Likert scale was marked "They know 
very little;" 5 was marked "They know something;" 10 was 
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marked "They know a great deal." Results and analysis are 
presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Survey Question 13 -- Analysis of results . 
...... 
std Mean, n or N t SS @ 
Xme or µ Oi = .05? 
Group 1 6.750 2.493 8 0.314 no 
Group 2 6.988 2.809 85 - - - - - -
Group 3 7.889 1. 269 9 1. 879 no 
Group 4 7.000 1. 826 7 0.067 no 
All 7.046 2.630 109 - - - - - -
statistical analysis of Question 13 did not support the 
polarization model, since statistically significant 
differences were not demonstrated. The new research 
hypothesis was therefore rejected, and the null accepted, 
for Question 13. 
Question 16: Question 16 asked survey respondents their 
measure of the acceptability of incineration as a way of 
reducing the risks of the contaminated harbor. O on the 
Likert scale was marked "Completely unacceptable;" 5 was 
marked "Not sure;" and 10 was marked "Completely 
acceptable." The existence of a polarized relationship 
between Groups 1 and 3 was graphically apparent; however, 
the relatively large standard deviation for Group 1 
prevented the use of the t-Test to test for significance of 
this group's responses. Results and analysis follow in 
Table 4 . 6. 
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Table 4.6: Survey Question 16 -- Analysis of results. 
r- Mean, xme std N t SS @ n or 
or µ, ex = .05? 
....-
Group 1 2.500 4.071 8 - - - - - -
Group 2 4.595 2.958 84 - - - - - -
t""" 
Group 3 8.556 1.590 9 6.737 yes 
Group 4 4.571 3.552 7 0.136 no 
All 4.769 3.222 108 - - - - - -
The polarization model could not be demonstrated 
statistically; the only statistically valid difference 
evident was that between Group 3 and the statistical 
universe. The null was accepted. 
Question 17: This question asked respondents to rate the 
risks of incinerating the contaminated harbor sediments, 
using a Likert scale whereon 0 was marked "High risk;" 5 was 
marked "Moderate risk;" and 10 represented "No risk." Once 
again, a polarized relationship between Groups 1 and 3 was 
graphically apparent. Since, however; the standard 
deviation for Groups 1 and 2 were larger than the means for 
those groups, the validity of statistical analysis using the 
parametric t-Test was called into question. Therefore, 
results alone follow in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7: Survey Question 17 -- Results. 
r- Mean, xme std n or t SS @ 
or µ. N ot = .05? 
...... 1.000 1.690 8 Group 1 - - - - - -
Group 2 2.917 2.909 84 - - - - - -
r-
Group 3 8.333 1.225 9 - - - - - -
Group 4 3.286 2.289 7 - - - - - -
All 3.250 3.130 108 - - - - - -
Inferences of statistical significance could not be drawn 
from the results of Question 17; therefore, the null 
hypothesis was once again accepted. 
Question 20: Question 20 asked respondents to what extent 
they thought the government's scientists actually knew about 
the health risks resulting from the proposed incineration of 
the harbor sediments. As in Question 13, O on the Likert 
scale was marked "They know very little;" 5 was marked "They 
know something;" 10 was marked "They know a great deal." 
Results and analysis are presented in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Survey Question 20 -- Analysis of results. 
Mean, xme std n or N t SS @ 
or µ. ot = .05? 
Group 1 5.000 2.726 8 0.435 no 
Group 2 5.185 2.881 81 - - - - - -
Group 3 7.778 2.636 9 2.500 yes 
Group 4 6.000 2.582 7 0.524 no 
All 5.448 2 . 892 105 - - - - - -
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Again, statistical analysis did not support the polarization 
model, but did demonstrate Group 3 to be a statistical 
outlier. The null hypothesis was accepted. 
Question 24: This question asked respondents what they 
thought would be the overall economic effect of USEPA's 
proposed incineration on the Greater New Bedford area. O on 
the Likert scale was marked "Harmful economic effect ; " 5 was 
marked "No economic effect;" 10 was marked "Positive 
economic effect." Results and analysis are presented in 
Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9: Survey Question 24 Analysis of results. 
Mean, Xme std n or N t SS @ 
or µ Ol = .05? 
Group 1 3.000 1. 690 8 3.117 yes 
Group 2 5.120 2.795 83 - - - - - -
Group 3 6.222 1.563 9 2.228 no 
Group 4 4.143 1.215 7 1.710 no 
All 4.991 2 . 644 107 - - - - - -
The Student t-Test, applied to the results of Question 24, 
showed Group 1 to be statistically different from the mean, 
while Group 3 was not. The new research hypothesis was thus 
rejected, and the null accepted; the polarization model 
appeared not to apply in this instance. 
Question 39: This question asked respondents whether a 
"p roven ... technology" (Likert score = 10) or an 
"innovative ... technology" (Likert = 0) was preferable for 
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cleaning up New Bedford Harbor, where a score of 5 indicated 
equal importance for the two extremes. Results and analysis 
are presented in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10: Survey Question 39 -- Analysis of results. 
r- Mean, xme std n or N t SS @ 
or µ Ci = .05? 
Group 1 4.875 1.885 8 1.098 no 
Group 2 5.468 4.785 79 - - - - - -
Group 3 7.444 1.590 9 3.179 yes 
Group 4 6.500 2.820 6 0.668 no 
All 5.657 4.350 102 - - - - - -
The research hypothesis could not be supported, since only 
Group 3 could be shown to differ, statistically, from the 
universal mean; the polarization model did not apply to the 
results of Question 39. Incidentally, the relatively large 
standard deviation associated with Group 2 seemed to imply 
that the public was largely ambivalent regarding the need 
for a time-tested sediment clean-up technology. 
Question 40: Question 40 asked respondents to compare the 
health risks stemming from the harbor contamination with 
those from the proposed incineration, using a Likert scale 
whereon O was marked "Incineration is greatest risk;" 5 was 
marked "Equal risks;" and 10 was marked "Existing 
contamination is greatest risk." Standard deviations andµ 
were too large to permit use of the t-Test; results alone 
are therefore presented in Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11: Survey Question 40 -- Results. 
i""" Mean, xme std n or N t SS @ 
or µ Ci = .05? 
I"""" 
Group 1 2.875 3.482 8 - - - - - -
Group 2 6.543 9.818 81 - - - - - -
Group 3 9.111 1.167 9 - - - - - -
r-
Group 4 7.500 3.332 6 - - - - - -
All 6.538 8.833 104 - - - - - -
While no inferences may be drawn regarding statistical 
significance of the results of Question 40, it may be noted 
that the standard deviation for groups 1 and 2 was quite 
large, while that for Group 3 was remarkably small. This 
seems to imply that the public remained deeply ambivalent 
about the relative risks of contamination versus 
incineration, whereas those Federal decisionmakers directly 
involved in the site had no doubt that incineration was far 
safer than forgoing cleanup of the contaminated harbor 
sediments. 
IV. D. 2. Analysis of frequency-based responses: 
Polarization. 
An examination of margin totals suggested that the 
results of a number of the survey's checklist questions 
might fit the polarization model. Where the polarized 
relationship was initially apparent, statistical analysis 
was undertaken using, once again, the X2 test corrected for 
continuity. 
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Question 9: As mentioned earlier, Question 9 asked 
respondents to identify whom they considered to be "at risk" 
from the contamination at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund 
site by checking from a list of fourteen demographic and 
geographic categories. The polarization relationship 
appeared in the responses to three of these sub-questions: 
Question 9b: Question 9b specified "Old people" as a 
possible category of individuals "at risk" from the harbor 
contamination. A summary of results and analysis, using the 
x2 test to compare Groups 1, 3 ,. and 4 with Group 2 I is 
presented in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12: Question 9b -- Analysis of results. 
Freq Freq. % Group Anal. xz SS@cx 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat. =.05 
Groupl 2 6 75 8 92 0.293 no 
Group2 35 49 58.3 84 - - - - - -
Group3 4 5 55.6 9 93 0.038 no 
Group4 3 4 57.1 7 91 0.114 no 
All 44 64 59.3 108 - - - - - -
Clearly, the null hypothesis could be accepted in the case 
of Question 9b: the polarized relationship was not 
statistically significant. 
Question 9d: Question 9d asked respondents whether they 
considered themselves to be "at risk" from the harbor 
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contamination. Results and analysis are presented in Table 
4.13. 
Table 4.13: Question 9d -- Analysis of results. 
Freq. Freq. % Group Anal. x2 SS @ 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat . Ol=.05 
Groupl 3 5 62 . 5 8 92 0.013 no 
Group2 39 45 53 . 6 84 - - - - - -
Group3 8 1 11.1 9 93 4.287 yes 
Group4 5 2 28.6 7 91 0.771 no 
All 55 53 49.1 108 - - - - - -
since the response of only one of the three smaller groups 
showed a statistically significant difference from that of 
the large random sample (Group 2), the null hypothesis was 
once again accepted: it was concluded that the polarization 
model did not apply to the results of Question 9d . However, 
Group 3 was, once again, demonstrated to be a statistical 
outlier . 
Question 9m: Question 9m asked respondents whether they 
considered "All residents of Dartmouth" to be "at risk" from 
the sediment contamination. Results and analysis are 
presented in Table 4.14. 
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Table 4.14: Question 9m -- Analysis of results. 
Freq Freq. % Group Anal. x2 SS@a 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat =.05 
Groupl 2 6 75 8 92 3.80 no 
i-
Group2 56 28 33.3 84 - - - - - -
Group3 8 1 11.1 9 93 0.98 no 
Group4 6 1 14.3 7 91 0.38 no 
All 72 36 33.3 108 - - - - - -
The lack of statistically significant differences among 
group responses to Question 9m required that the null 
hypothesis be accepted in this instance. 
Question 10: Question 10 asked respondents to choose from a 
list of nine ailments in order to express what they 
considered to be "the health risks of the current 
contamination." The responses to two of these nine sub-
questions appeared to fit the polarization model; thus 
statistical testing, summarized in the tables below, was 
undertaken. 
Question lOa: Question lOa presented "Cancer" as a possible 
risk of the harbor contamination . Results and analysis 
appear in Table 4 . 15. 
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Table 4.15: Question lOa -- Analysis of results. 
r;--
Freq. Freq. % Group Anal. xi SS @ 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat. 0!=.05 
Groupl 2 5 71. 4 7 87 0.01 no 
I"'" 
Group2 18 62 77.5 80 - - - - - -
Group3 0 9 100 9 89 1. 34 no 
Group4 1 6 85.7 7 87 . 0007 no 
All 21 82 79.6 103 - - - - - -
The null hypothesis was accepted in this instance, as a 
result of the lack of statistically significant differences 
among group responses. 
Question lOc: Question lOc listed "Respiratory problems" as 
a possible risk of the harbor contamination. Results and 
analysis are presented in Table 4.16. 
Table 4.16: Question lOc -- Analysis of results. 
Freq Freq. % Group Anal. xi SS @ 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat 0!=.05 
Groupl 1 6 85.7 7 87 0.15 no 
Group2 23 57 71.2 80 - - - - - -
Group3 7 2 22.2 9 89 6.65 yes 
Group4 4 3 42.9 7 87 1. 28 no 
All 35 68 66.0 103 - - - - - -
Again, the research hypothesis was rejected, and the null 
accepted, due to the lack of significant differences among 
group responses to Question lOc. Group 3 was once again the 
sole statistical outlier. 
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Question llf: Question 11 utilized a checklist naming six 
possible pathways to ask respondents how health risks might 
be transferred from the Superfund site to the population . 
Of the six sub-questions, only one appeared to support the 
polarized relationship: sub-question llf, which referred to 
"Eating garden vegetables." Results and analysis appear in 
Table 4.17. 
Table 4.17: Question 11£ -- Analysis of results. 
Freq. Freq. % Group Anal . x2 SS @ 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat. a=.05 
Groupl 5 3 37.5 8 92 0.122 no 
Group2 53 31 36.9 ·84 - - - - - -
Group3 8 1 11.1 9 93 1. 39 no 
Group4 6 1 14.3 7 91 0.628 no 
All 72 36 33.3 108 - - - - - -
The null hypothesis was once again accepted for the results 
of Question llf. 
Question 26: This question offered respondents a checklist 
of eight possible outcomes of the government's clean-up of 
New Bedford Harbor, asking them which results they would 
prefer . Three of the sub-questions which appeared to show 
the polarized relationship were tested for significance; 
analysis and results are summarized in the following tables. 
Question 26a: This sub-question asked whether respondents 
would like to see the 11 Clean-up ... provide jobs. " 
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Table 4.18: Question 26a -- Analysis of results. 
r-- Freq. Freq. % Group Anal. x2 SS @ 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat. Ol=.05 
Groupl 2 6 75 8 90 0.154 no 
Group2 20 62 75.6 82 - - - - - -
Group3 7 2 22.2 9 91 8.667 yes 
Group4 1 5 83.3 6 88 0.005 no 
All 30 75 71.4 105 - - - - - -
The null hypothesis was once again accepted; again, Group 3 
appeared as a statistical outlier. 
Question 26c: This sub-question put forth "restore 
commercial options of harbor" as a clean- up result. 
Table 4.19: Question 26c -- Analysis of results. 
Freq. Freq. % Group Anal. x2 SS @ 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat. Ol=.05 
Groupl 1 7 87.5 8 90 0.009 no 
Group2 17 65 79.3 82 - - - - - -
Group3 4 5 55.6 9 91 1.41 no 
Group4 0 6 100 6 -88 0.498 no 
All 22 83 79.0 105 - - - - - -
Due to the inability of the analysis to show statistical 
differences between the study groups and the universal mean, 
the research hypothesis was rejected, and the null accepted, 
for Question 26c . 
Question 26e: This sub-question asked whether respondents 
would like to see the clean-up "enhance tourism." 
114 
Table 4.20: Question 26e -- Analysis of results. 
r- Freq. Freq. % Group Anal. xz SS @ 
"no" "yes" "yes" n N stat . CX=.05 
,... 
Groupl 3 5 62.5 8 90 0.030 no 
Group2 39 43 52.4 82 - - - - - -
I"'"' 
Group3 7 2 22.2 9 91 1.877 no 
Group4 2 4 66.6 6 88 0.063 no 
All 51 54 51.4 105 - - - - - -
Again, the research hypothesis was rejected, and the null 
accepted, for Question 26e, since none of the differences 
between groups proved significant . 
As a result of the foregoing analyses, it was concluded 
that the polarization model was not present to a 
statistically significant degree in any of the survey's 
checklist questions. Nor was polarization discernable in 
the responses to any of the survey's rank-order questions . 
IV. D. 3. Summary of analysis: Polarization. 
Though initially apparent in 33% · of the study's core 
Likert-scale questions, the polarization model was not 
statistically demonstrable in this category of question. Of 
the six Likert-scale questions which were analyzed 
statistically, however, Group 3, the manager-participants, 
proved to be a statistical outlier in three instances (50%) 
Though initially apparent in 23.7% of the study's 
checklist sub-questions , statistical analysis failed to 
demonstrate existence of the polarization model for this 
category of question, as well. Of the ten checklist sub-
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questions analyzed statistically, Group 3 was a statistical 
outlier in 33% of cases (3 of 10) . 
The polarized relationship was not discernable in any 
of the study's rank-order questions. 
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IV· E. Trust in government and expectation of benefits. 
Besides looking at perceptions of risk regarding the 
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation, the 
survey attempted to measure respondents' degree of trust in 
government, expectation of benefits resulting from the 
superfund clean-up, and degree of knowledge regarding the 
source of funds for the remediation. With two exceptions 
(Questions 13 and 20, discussed above), the responses to 
questions pertaining to these issues supported neither the 
hypothesized relationship nor the polarization model; thus 
they were omitted from the foregoing analysis. In order, 
however, to complete the study, and to gain the most 
thorough understanding of respondents' perceptions regarding 
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, this group of 
questions was subjected to the same statistical analysis as 
This was used for the study's other Likert-scale questions. 
step was undertaken in order to determine whether the 
smaller groups, (1, 3, and 4) differed from the universal 
mean, dominated by the public random sample (Group 2). 
IV. E. 1. Trust in government decisionmaking. 
Question 13: Respondents were asked to what extent they 
thought the government's scientists actually knew about the 
health risks stemming from the existing harbor 
contamination. Question 13 was discussed above; results and 
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analysis were presented in Table 4.5; no SSDs were 
demonstrable. 
Question 20: Survey participants were asked how much they 
thought USEPA's scientists ''really [knew]" about the health 
risks of the proposed incineration. Question 20 was 
discussed above, and a summary of response and analysis 
presented (Table 4.8). Only Group 3 was statistically 
different from the universal mean. 
Question 21: Participants were asked "to what extent" they 
thought USEPA "[told] the public the truth" about the risks 
of incineration. The question utilized a Likert scale, 
where 0 was labelled "They tell very little of the truth;" 5 
was marked "They tell some of the truth," and 10 represented 
"They tell the truth 100%." Results and analysis are 
summarized in Table 4.21. 
Table 4.21: Survey Question 21 -- Results and analysis. 
Mean, xme std n or N t SS @ 
or µ Ol = .05? 
Group 1 4.625 1.768 8 0.548 no 
Group 2 4.329 2.807 82 - - - -
Group 3 9.333 0.707 9 17.371 yes 
Group 4 7.571 1.813 7 3.486 yes 
All 4.991 2.987 106 - - - -
Statistical analysis suggested that both professional groups 
(3 and 4) were statistically dissimilar from the public 
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random sample (Group 2), while the citizen-participants were 
not. 
Question 23: This question asked survey participants how 
well USEPA was working to protect the public health with 
respect to the New Bedford Harbor Superfund. The Likert 
scale equated a value of O with "A poor job;" 5 with "An 
o.K. job;" and 10 with "An excellent job." Results and 
analysis follow in Table 4.22. 
Table 4.22: Survey Question 23 -- Results and analysis. 
Mean, xme std n or N t SS @ 
or µ Ci = .05? 
Group 1 4.750 1.752 8 1.380 no 
Group 2 3.099 2.107 81 - - - -
Group 3 7.750 2.659 8 3.894 yes 
Group 4 6.857 1.952 7 3.021 yes 
All 3.836 2.581 104 - - - -
In this instance, analysis showed that the professional 
groups each differed, statistically, from the public random 
sample, while the citizen-participant group (Group 1) did 
not. 
IV. E. 2. Expectation of benefits from clean-up. 
Question 22: An attempt was made to gauge respondents' 
expectation of benefits resulting from the Superfund clean-
up of the Acushnet by asking "how clean, and how safe" 
respondents expected the river to be when the clean-up was 
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complete. The question used a Likert scale on which 0 was 
marked "As dirty and unsafe as before;" 3.5 was marked "Safe 
for swimming;" 7.5 was marked "Fish will be edible;" and 10 
was marked "Shellfish will be edible." Response and 
analysis are summarized in Table 4.23. 
Table 4.23: Survey Question 22 -- Results and analysis. 
Mean, xme std n or N t SS @ 
or µ Ol = .05? 
Group 1 3.500 1.512 8 0.247 no 
Group 2 3.562 2.903 80 - - - -
Group 3 5.250 2.712 8 1.570 no 
Group 4 2.857 2.410 7 0.797 no 
All 3.641 2.790 103 - - - -
In this instance, no statistical differences could be 
discerned among groups. 
Question 29: A different approach to measuring respondents' 
expectations of Superfund clean-up benefits was used in 
Questions 29 and 30, each of which asked a willingness-to-
pay question regarding the harbor clean-up. Question 29 
asked respondents how much they would "personally" be 
willing to pay to be sure that the Acushnet would be 
restored to a state where "fish and shellfish were safe to 
eat, and the river was safe for children to swim in." A 
Likert scale divided into ten increments was provided; these 
were marked with dollar values ranging from O to "Over 
$1000." Standard deviations were generally too large to 
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permit the use of the Student-t test; therefore, results 
alone are presented in Table 4.24. 
Table 4.24: Survey Question 29 -- Results. 
Mean, Xme std n or N t SS @ 
or µ, ot = .05? 
Group 1 683.33 376.39 6 - - - -
r-
Group 2 186.90 318.98 79 - - - -
Group 3 116.67 68.31 6 - - - -
Group 4 428.57 419.18 7 - - - -
All 230.25 343.65 98 - - - -
In spite of the study's inability to use statistical methods 
in this instance, strong differences in mean willingness-to-
p~y by group were readily apparent. The citizen-
participants (Group 1) placed the highest value, by far, on 
a pristine Acushnet; non-participant managers (Group 4) also 
valued such an outcome highly . Notably, the managers who 
participated in the facilitated discussions, Group 3, placed 
the lowest value upon a pristine Acushnet, a mere 17% of 
Group l's valuation; Group 3's valuation amounted to only 
62.4% of that of the New Bedford Area's relatively poor 
public, as represented by the study's stratified random 
sample (Group 2). 
Question 30: This question was similar to Question 29, and 
used an identical Likert scale, graduated from O to "Over 
$1000. 11 Unlike the preceding question, however, Question 30 
posited a scenario where the river was "no longer highly 
contaminated, but still not safe enough to swim or fish. 11 
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Again, due to large standard deviations, results are 
expressed in Table 4.25 without test results. 
Table 4.25: Survey Question 30 -- Results and analysis. 
Mean, x~ std n or N t SS @ 
or µ a = .05? 
Group 1 391.67 471.61 6 -- - -
~ 
Group 2 26.71 45.91 80 -- --
Group 3 50.00 31.62 6 -- --
Group 4 181.43 220.79 7 -- --
All 61.18 157.42 99 -- --
Again, large differences between group means were apparent, 
in spite of the inappropriateness of statistical analysis to 
this set of responses. In this instance, however, the 
public random sample (Group 2) least valued the posited 
outcome. 
Within each group, there seemed to be a large 
difference between the value placed on the Question 29 
scenario, and that associated with Question 30's 
hypothetical situation, though here, too, statistical 
confirmation was not possible. For Group 1, a cleaner river 
was worth 57% of what the pristine river was worth; for 
Group 2, the figure was less than 15%; and for both Group 3 
and Group 4, the proportion was approximately 43%. 
IV. E. 3. Knowledge of source of funds. 
The last survey question for which responses were 
examined attempted to discern to what extent respondents 
were aware of the sources of funding of the Superfund clean-
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UP· As mentioned in an earlier section, corporations 
responsible for the contamination of New Bedford Harbor 
(potentially responsible parties: PRPs) have agreed to 
contribute $110 million toward the clean-up, although 
superfund itself provided federal monies for the initial 
investigations and planning, cost-recovery actions, etc. 
Question 28: Respondents were asked, simply, "Who will pay 
for this [Superfund] cleanup?" Written responses were 
divided into two sub-groups: those which recognized the 
contribution of the PRPs, versus those which expressed a 
belief that "government" or "the taxpayer" would bear the 
entire burden. Statistical testing for differences among 
groups was then undertaken in the same manner as for all 
other frequency-based responses, using the Chi-Square (X2 ) 
test corrected for continuity and cast into a 2x2 
contingency table. Results and analysis are summarized in 
Table 4.26. 
Table 4.26: Question 28 ~- Results and analysis. 
Freq. Freq. % Group Anal . x2 SS @ 
"Tax" "PRP" "PRP" n N stat. Ci=.05 
Groupl 1 6 85.7 7 68 6.981 yes 
Group2 44 17 27.9 61 - - - - - -
Group3 0 9 100 9 70 14.52 yes 
Group4 1 4 80.0 5 66 3.635 no 
All 46 36 - - - - - -
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In this instance, the response of Group 3, like that of 
Group 1, differed significantly from the response of Group 
2. It is notable that a large majority of the public random 
sample, Group 2, expressed a lack of knowledge of the most 
important source of funding for remediation of the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
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V. Conclusions. 
A MaJ'or hypothesis. v. . 
The research has not supported the major hypothesis. 
The study has concluded, therefore, that the facilitated 
discussions held by the Massachusetts Office of Dispute 
Resolution did not result in the convergence of risk 
perceptions of citizens and managers regarding the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. On the basis of the 
literature survey, the study had defined such a convergence 
as a measure of the discussions' effectiveness in resolving 
conflict at the Site. In other words, the study showed that 
the facilitated discussions were not effective, within the 
definition of effectiveness adopted by the study. 
This conclusion stands in contrast to the study's 
initial, implicit assumption that the discussions were 
indeed effective in resolving conflict at the New Bedford 
Harbor Superfund Site. It forces, therefore, a re-
assessment of this assumption. A re-examination of the 
course of events at the Site, in light of the knowledge that 
perceptions between citizens and managers did not converge, 
suggests that the facilitated discussions did not resolve 
conflict at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site. 
As a result of the communication which took place 
within the discussions, prolonged legal action was clearly 
averted, and USEPA abandoned its plans to incinerate the Hot 
Spot sediments. However, at the time of this writing, 
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citizens and managers have yet to agree upon a specific 
treatment method for the contaminated harbor sediments. The 
agreement to study the problem and search for alternative 
treatment technologies has placated the citizen activists 
and apparently given USEPA a sense that the cleanup is 
somehow moving forward. But until citizens and planners 
agree upon a treatment method, a solution has not been 
found. 
In short, the citizens won, defeating the incineration 
proposal through the medium of the facilitated discussions, 
in spite of the lack of acceptable alternatives. As the 
study has shown, it would have been most difficult for them 
to achieve a comparable result by means of legal action. To 
the extent the discussions have succeeded in averting 
conflict, then, they seem to have done so by effectively 
democratizing USEPA's Superfund decisionmaking process. And 
yet, when a plan which is years in the making is rejected in 
spite of the lack of clear alternatives, one is left with 
little wonder that Superfund has been found to be among the 
least cost-effective of Federal environmental laws. 
Having rejected its major hypothesis as well as an 
implicit, but fundamental, assumption, it remains for this 
study to examine the survey data more descriptively, in an 
effort to understand the nature of the conflict over 
remediation and the workings of the facilitated discussions 
Within the context of public perceptions of the New Bedford 
Harbor Superfund Site. 
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v. a. Discussion of other findings. 
v. B. 1. Polarization. 
Upon examination of means and frequencies of responses 
to the survey's core questions, it appeared that a 
polarization of perception between citizens and managers 
engaged in the facilitated discussions might be 
demonstrable. Statistical analysis, however, failed to 
support the existence of this model. Polarization was 
graphically apparent, if not statistically demonstrable, in 
16 of the survey's 33 core questions (48%). While the 
necessarily small n of three of the four study groups 
limited the ability of the statistical analyses to 
distinguish subtler differences among groups, the graphic 
prevalence of the polarization model suggests that it has 
some meaning in describing the relationship among the study 
groups. 
If polarization of perceptions among citizens and 
managers exists to some degree, the relationship offers an 
explanation for the discussions' ability to avert, without 
resolving, conflict at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund 
Site. The discussions appear to have engaged those groups 
holding the most intense views on either side of the 
controversy. By bringing these diametrically opposed groups 
to the table, the discussions brought them out of the public 
fora--court~ooms, newspapers, and City Hall. And yet, these 
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groups--in fact a very small number of people--were those 
least likely to ultimately agree to a specific solution. 
The involvement of those citizens with the most 
vehement views about incineration would seem to be the 
direct result of the Office of Dispute Resolution's 
inclusive approach to choosing discussion participants. In 
contrast, the earlier citizens' group, the New Bedford 
community Work Group, appointed by the city's mayor, 
satisfied CERCLA's public involvement provisions without 
involving the citizens' groups which were most opposed to 
USEPA's incineration plans. To the extent, then, that the 
polarization relationship may exist, it seems to suggest 
that, by the time the facilitated discussions began, a chasm 
of perception had developed between a small group of 
citizens and the federal decisionmakers, regarding the 
harbor Superfund site. Arguably, the foundation of the 
conflict over remediation of the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund site was laid at the outset of the CERCLA public 
participation process, when USEPA and the City organized a 
citizens' advisory group which failed to involve the most 
passionate critics of the proposed incineration. This is 
an attractive conclusion, intuitively appealing; yet it must 
be regarded cautiously due to the inability of the study to 
show that the polarized relationship between citizens and 
managers involved in the facilitated discussions existed to 
a statistically significant degree. 
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v. B. 2. Group 3 as statistical outlier. 
rn its analyses of differences in risk perception among 
the study groups, the study discovered only one trend for 
which statistical significance could be substantiated. This 
relationship showed Group 3 (the manager-participants) to be 
a statistical outlier: different from the study's universal 
mean (for Likert-scale questions) or from Group 2 
(frequency-based responses). In 6 of the study's 11 
analyses of Likert-scale questions (54%), Group 3 was a 
statistical outlier; in 4 of these instances (35%) it was 
the sole outlier. In 4 of the _ study's 11 analyses of 
frequency-based questions (35%), Group 3 was a statistical 
outlier; in two of these cases (10%) it was the sole 
outlier. 
Questions where Group 3 was a statistical outlier dealt 
with a diversity of issues, including the risks of the 
contamination (Questions 9d, lOc), the risks of the 
incineration (Question 16), the goals and methods of the 
clean-up (Questions 39 and 26a), and degree of trust in 
government (Questions 20, 21, and 23). The divergence of 
the manager-participants' perceptions from those of the 
public suggests two types of communicative failures on the 
part of the government decisionmakers: failure to 
communicate the risks of the site and the goals of the 
clean-up to the clean-up's natural constituency, and failure 
to incorporate the ideals of the community regarding the 
cleanup into their own views of the situation. The goals of 
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a superfund cleanup are largely fixed by the law itself. 
However, if site managers expect the support of a community, 
they must communicate the benefits of those goals, and, 
where possible, craft an implementation plan which works 
toward satisfying community goals to the extent possible 
while meeting the requirements of the law. 
Perhaps the most interesting of these results are those 
which show the perceptions of the Group 3 managers to be the 
sole statistical outlier. Here, the perceptions of the 
manager-participants differ not only from those of the 
citizens' groups but from those of the resource managers who 
did not participate in the facilitated discussions. This 
suggests that Group 3's perceptual differences do not stem 
solely from their professional orientation, but also from 
the process of their involvement in decisionmaking, conflict 
and dialogue at the Superfund Site. 
V. B. 3. Trust in government. 
The study found that the public groups shared a 
relatively low degree of trust in the ability of the 
government to determine and deal with the problems arising 
from the contamination and its remediation. Responses to 
Question 13 (Table 4.5) reflected cautious optimism 
concerning the government's knowledge of the risks of the 
site. However, when asked how much the government's 
scientists knew about the risks of the incineration 
(Question 20, Table 4.8), mean Likert response of the public 
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groups (Groups 1 and 2) rested at approximately 5, or "They 
know something," where 10 represented "They know a great 
deal." Asked to what extent the government decisionmakers 
"[told] the public the truth" about the risks of 
incineration (Question 21, Table 4 . 21), mean response for 
both public groups was even lower, in the 4.5 range, near 
"They tell some of the truth." 
A finding, in 1994, of lack of trust in government 
among the public will surprise no one. However, this, too, 
sheds light on the source of the controversy over 
remediation of the New Bedford . Harbor Superfund Site. If 
citizens do not believe that the government can, or will, 
accurately assess and communicate the risks attending its 
environmental decisionmaking, they have no reason to support 
it. As rational actors under such circumstances, they will 
"take the devil they know," or think they know (the 
contaminated harbor) over the one that they do not 
(incineration) . 
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v. B. 4. Expectation of benefits. 
Three of the survey's questions (22, 29, and 30) 
examined respondents' expectation of benefits from the 
harbor clean-up . While analysis of Question 22 (Table 4.23) 
found the response of Group 3 to be significantly higher 
than that of the other groups, no group felt that fish in 
the harbor, after clean-up, would be safe to eat; Group 2 
expected the harbor to be just safe enough for swimming 
(mean Likert score = 3.6). Clearly, public expectation of 
water quality improvement as a result of the Superfund 
project was low . 
Perhaps a more insightful measure of public expectation 
of benefits of the site is revealed by the comparison of 
responses to Questions 29 and 30 (Tables 4.24 and 4.25). 
Group 2 valued a pristine Acushnet at $186.90, compared with 
$26.71 for a cleaner, but not useable, river. This seven-
fold difference is indicative, again, of low public 
expectation of benefit resulting from the Superfund clean-
up. 
The consequences of these findings are similar to those 
stemming from a finding of lack of trust in government. 
Where local residents do not perceive a clear benefit 
resulting from a potentially risky project, such as 
incineration of the harbor sediments, they would be foolish 
to support it. If a governmental agency wishes to convince 
a public that a project is necessary, it must communicate 
132 
the advantages of that project to those who, presumably, 
stand to benefit the most from it. 
v. B. s. Knowledge of source of funding. 
Question 28 (Table 4.26) found a majority of the public 
random sample (72% of Group 2) to be unaware of the $110 
million contribution which the capacitor manufacturers made 
toward the cost of the harbor clean-up. This factor also 
helps explain the cynicism and lack of support which the 
public expressed toward the harbor clean-up. Arguably, a 
more widespread knowledge of the PRP settlement would impart 
to the public a sense of justice: the ''polluter pays" 
principle. If, however, much of the public believes that 
she, as a taxpayer, is being forced to pay for the 
construction of a hazardous waste incinerator in her own 
neighborhood, the sense of victimization is complete. 
Again, the data are expressive of a failure in communication 
on the part of environmental decisionmakers, contributing to 
the conflict over remediation of the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site. 
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v. c. The New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and the 
reauthorization of CERCLA. 
The study has demonstrated, unexpectedly, that the 
facilitated discussions chaired by the Massachusetts Office 
of Dispute Resolution regarding the New Bedford Harbor 
superfund Site did not resolve conflict over the site, . where 
such resolution is defined as a convergence of risk 
perceptions. Rather, it seems that the effect of the 
discussions was to avert conflict by democratizing the 
decisionmaking process and fostering communication among the 
groups in opposition, without reconciling these groups' 
differences regarding the risks and benefits of the site and 
its cleanup. The extent to which the discussions succeeded 
in averting conflict appears to have been a function of 
their involvement of those groups with the most widely 
divergent views. 
The study suggests that the public/governmental 
conflict over remediation of the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site was caused, in part, by USEPA's failure to 
communicate to the public the risks of the site or the 
benefits of the proposed clean-up. The study's legal 
component has shown that easy solutions to such conflict are 
not to be found in the courtroom, but that the facilitated 
discussions in effect handed the group opposed to 
incineration a result which they would have had difficulty 
achieving in court. 
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The proposals for CERCLA's reauthorization which were 
considered by Congress in 1994 called for greatly expanded 
public involvement in the Superfund decisionmaking process. 
This study suggests that, to the extent that such a reform 
might involve citizens in Superfund decisionmaking before 
conflict arises, it holds promise for facilitating the 
peaceful implementation of Superfund clean-up plans in the 
future. The results of the study suggest a caveat, as well: 
that once conflict has arisen, improved public participation 
may not solve the problem, but simply prolong and politicize 
it. Such situations can only worsen Superfund's well-
documented lack of cost-effectiveness. 
The treatment of hazardous waste, generally, has proven 
to be among the most difficult of problems in public 
environmental policy. The clean-up of Superfund sites, 
therefore, will undoubtedly continue to generate 
controversy, particularly among those who reside in the area 
surrounding a proposed facility. Communication between 
government and citizens regarding such situations is fraught 
with difficulty. The issues are complex; risks and benefits 
are uncertain; lack of trust in government is a tremendous 
obstacle. The entire public participation process is a 
messy one. 
And yet, as the New Bedford experience has shown, a 
small group of citizens is capable of short-circuiting a 
multi-million dollar remediation plan that ignores their 
interests. As glaringly imperfect as the process may be, 
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public participation in Superfund decisionmaking which is, 
in the words of the 1994 Senate Superfund reauthorization 
bill, ''early, direct and meaningful" would seem to be, at 
this point, society's best bet for overcoming conflict in 
order to clean up contaminated sites successfully, 
expeditiously, and democratically. Local residents are the 
natural constituents of an environmental clean-up; in order 
to earn their support, environmental professionals should 
endeavor to keep them informed of the most important aspects 
of a project. By paying due attention to the opinions of 
local residents, as well, USEPA and other environmental 
agencies may work toward avoiding prolonged conflicts of the 
type which has attended the New Bedford Harbor Superfund 
Site. 
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Appendix A: Initial perceptions of citizens and managers 
drawn from Jan 5, 1994 facilitated 
discussion. 
The second of the series of facilitated discussions 
regarding the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site was held on 
January 5, 1994, at the Greater New Bedford Vocational High 
school. At the request of the facilitator, Michael Keating, 
each of the discussion participants expressed his or her 
interests regarding the Site, in order for the group to 
understand the criteria of all sides in the environmental 
dispute. Individual participants were: 
Citizen Representatives: 
Concerned Parents of Fairhaven 
Claudia Kirk 
Kathleen Rocha 
Downwind Coalition 
Neal Balboni 
Diana Cabbold 
Carol Sanz 
Hands Across the River 
Eugene Grace 
David Hammond 
James Simmons 
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M.Vnicipal Officials: 
&irhaven: 
patrick Mullin 
Jeff Osuch 
ru::ushnet: 
Roland Peppin 
New Bedford -- Mayor's Office 
Arthur Caron 
New Bedford -- City Council 
David Gerwatowski 
Fred Kalisz 
George Rogers 
Professional Resource Managers 
US Environmental Protection Agency 
Frank Ciavatteri 
Harley Laing 
John McNeil 
Massachussetts Department of Environmental Protection 
(MADEP) 
Paul Craffey 
Jay Naparstek 
Helen Waldorf 
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The following is an analytical summary, compiled 31 May 
1994 1 of the major perceptual differences which emerged 
between the citizen representatives and the professional 
resource managers, gleaned from a videotape of the 
proceedings in the collection of the New Bedford Public 
Library. This identification of issues and differences was 
used to formulate the descriptive survey which serves as the 
principle data-gathering tool for this study. 
It must be mentioned that, during this discussion, the 
elected officials stressed their alignment with the 
citizens' groups, thereby validating the choice of this 
research to combine elected officials with citizens for 
purposes of analysis. 
I. Health risks associated with contamination v. risks of 
incineration 
A. Citizens unconvinced of ambient risks of site; 
note uncertainty of science, age of data (1988) 
Managers express great implicit faith in accuracy 
of risk assessment, relevance of State ambient 
criteria. 
B. Citizens fearful of health risks resulting 
directly from incineration: stack emmissions 
(dioxin, furans, toxic metal particulate); solid 
waste (toxic ash) . 
Managers convinced that incineration will not 
cause significant new health risk. 
C. Citizens fearful of hazards resulting indirectly 
from incineration: risk of fire or explosion. 
Managers express faith in efficacy of risk 
management. 
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I Willingness to consider incineration I . 
A. Citizens strongly oppose incineration; believe 
that emphasis of forum should be on finding 
alternatives. 
Managers: Incineration remains a viable option; 
cost of switch in technologies must be justified. 
II Economics of incineration and remediation I . 
A. Citizens believe hazardous waste incineration will 
cause economic harm to tourism and property 
values. 
Managers believe that timely cleanup of Hot Spot 
is key to economic revitalization of the harbor. 
B. Citizens: Stigma of incineration will be 
permanent. 
Managers: Incineration will produce short-term 
effect only. 
IV . Cost of remediation alternative 
A. Citizens : Public health is more important than 
cost; managers seem too concerned with costs. 
Managers: Public health is paramount but agencies 
are obligated to contain cost, as well. 
B. Citizens: The safest and best alternative must be 
found, in spite of existing decisions and 
contracts. 
Managers: Existing decisions are difficult and 
expensive to change. 
V. Time scale of remediation 
A. Citizens stress need to take the time to make the 
proper choice of a remediation alternative. 
Managers express need to expedite the cleanup, to 
reduce present risks. 
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VI. Trust in government decisionmaking 
A. Citizens: Agencies are not doing their job to 
adequately protect health of residents: lack of 
monitoring of PCB air emmissions from dredging; 
lack of EPA concern with metals. 
Managers: Human health and the environment are our 
paramount concerns 
B. Citizens: Agencies have not adequately 
facilitated public involvement: outreach, 
education, response. 
Managers express desire to work with the public, 
to come to an agreement regarding cleanup of the 
site. 
c. Citizens: Managers are creating negotiation 
context which favors the chosen alternative, re 
scheduling of dredging and availability of 
technical assistance. 
Managers express willingness to keep an open mind, 
and consider alternatives. 
VII. Scientific uncertainty 
A. Citizens: Scientific uncertainty casts doubt on 
incineration. 
Managers: uncertainty favors incineration. 
B. Citizens express desire to consider innovative 
technologies. 
Managers express importance of relying on proven 
technology. 
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Appendix B: Texts of coverletters and surveys. 
contents: 
B. 1. 
B. 2. 
B. 3. 
B. 4. 
B. 5. 
B. 6. 
Coverletter for administration of survey to public 
random sample (Group 2), English. 
Public version of survey (Groups 1 and 2), 
English. 
Coverletter for administration and public version 
of survey (Group 2), Portuguese. 
Public version of survey (Groups 1 and 2), 
Portuguese. 
Sample of personalized coverletter used to 
administer survey to smaller groups (Groups 1, 3, 
and 4) . 
Survey questions specific to profes~ional groups 
(Groups 3 and 4) . · 
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B· 1. Coverletter for administration of survey to public 
random sample (Group 2), English. 
(Researcher name, affiliation and address) 
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site Survey 
Dear Madam or Sir: 
As you probably know, the sediments (mud) of the 
Acushnet River are contaminated with high levels of PCBs 
(polychlorinated biphenyls), particularly in the area north 
of the Coggeshall St. Bridge, between the towns of New 
Bedford and Acushnet. What to do about this contamination 
has been the source of great controversy over the past 
several years; the Federal Government, the State, and 
citizens' groups have all gotten involved in this debate. 
This is an opinion survey, from which we hope to learn 
how you, personally, feel about this contaminated area of 
the river, which the government calls the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site. We hope that this survey won't take more 
than 15 minutes of your time. Some of the questions may 
seem irrelevant, but please answer them anyway. There are 
no right or wrong answers; please read the questions 
carefully, then answer them in the way that best reflects 
your personal opinion. 
The information which you provide will be kept 
COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Your name will not be given to any 
organization or company of any kind; you will not be put on 
any mailing lists. The surveys will be destroyed once the 
results are tabulated. 
If you have any comments or questions about the survey, 
or about individual questions, you may contact Dr. Niels 
West, 401-792-2596, or the Vice Provost for Research, 70 
Lower College Rd., University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 
02881, 401-792-2635. 
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Sincerely, 
(Signed) 
(Researcher name 
and address) 
B. 2. Public version of survey (Groups 1 and 2), 
English. 
SURVEY --
Concerning the NEW BEDFORD HARBOR SUPERFUND SITE, 
Upper Acushnet River, New Bedford, Massachusetts. 
The following survey should take about 15 minutes to 
complete. Please read the questions carefully, and answer 
them as completely and accurately as possible. THERE ARE NO 
RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS. Your responses will be kept 
COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Thank you for your time. 
Date: 
Town: 
How long have you lived in the.New Bedford area?-~ years. 
What does this company do? 
1. Did you know that there is a SUPERFUND SITE, that is, a 
FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE in the Acushnet 
river? 
Yes No 
2. If so, approximately how long have you known about this 
site? (Please check one) 
Less than 6 months ... 
---6 months to 1 year ... 
---1-2 years ........... . 
2-5 years ........... . ---
More than 5 years .... ---
---
3. Have you ever been active in any group or organization 
which was concerned with this Superfund site? 
Yes No 
4. If "yes," please name the group 
When, approximately, were you active in it? 
(Month/Year) : I to I 
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s. Do you smoke cigarettes? 
Yes Sometimes No 
---
6. Do you wear a seatbelt when you drive? 
Yes Sometimes No 
7. What SOURCES OF INFORMATION are important to you, 
concerning LOCAL events and controversies? 
(Please CHECK all that apply.) 
Radio 
Television 
Newspaper (please name) 
Conversation with friends or neighbors, or at work 
Children hear about things at school 
Town meetings or public meetings 
Other (Please write in) . 
The rest of this survey asks about the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site and its clean-up. Some of the questions make 
use of a line, called a Likert scale, which symbolizes a 
range of values between two opposite ideas. PLEASE READ 
EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY, THEN PLACE AN "X" anywhere along 
the line, at the point which best reflects your judgement. 
EXAMPLE 
X. In your opinion, what is a good day to go to the beach? 
Cloudy 
day only 
Any 
day 
Sunny 
day only 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I-~--I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
According to the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP), the Acushnet River is 
CONTAMINATED WITH PCBS AND TOXIC METALS, particularly in the 
area north of the Coggeshall St. bridge. The next six 
questions relate to this CURRENT pollution problem. Please 
DO NOT consider EPA's recent dredging activities in making 
your assessment. In other words, "CURRENT" FOR THESE 
PURPOSES MEANS IN THE LAST YEAR OR SO. 
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8 . To what extent do you feel that the contamination of the 
Acushnet River is a HEALTH RISK? 
No current 
health risk 
Moderate 
health risk 
Great current 
health risk 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9. Who would you say is AT RISK from this contamination? 
(Please CHECK ALL that apply) . 
children .......................................... . 
---Old people ......................................... __ _ 
Sick people ....................................... . 
---People who eat fish ............................... . 
---People who use boats ............................... __ _ 
Portuguese people ................................. . 
---Non-Portuguese people ............................. . 
---Residents of the neighborhood where the pollution is 
All residents of New Bedford ....................... --
All residents of Acushnet ......................... . 
---All residents of Fair Haven ....................... . 
---All residents of Dartmouth ........................ . 
All residents of Southeastern Massachusetts ........ ---
Other (Please write in) 
-------------------
10. WHAT do you see as the health risks of the current 
contamination? (Please CHECK ALL that apply.) 
Cancer ...................... . 
---Skin problems ............... . 
---Respiratory problems ........ . 
---Liver problems .............. . 
Heart trouble ................ ---
Leukemia .................... . 
---Sexual problems ............. . 
Kidney trouble ............. . . ---
---Brain problems .............. . 
---
Other (please write in) : 
11. In your opinion, HOW might these risks be transferred 
from the river to humans? (Please CHECK ALL that apply) 
Bre th' · a ing air ...... . D' . ---1gg1ng soil ....... . 
Eating fish ......... ---
Drinking water .......... . 
---Swimming ................ . 
---Eating garden vegetables. 
---
Other (please name) 
-----------------------
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12. Are you a commercial fisherman, or are any of your 
family or close friends commercial fishermen? 
Yes No 
Relationship: 
Yourself~- Immediate family~- Extended family~- Friend 
What kind of fishing? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
13. The Government (EPA) has completed studies which show 
that the CONTAMINATION of the Acushnet is a real health risk 
to local people. In your opinion, how certain is this 
assessment? In other words, HOW MUCH do you think that the 
Government's scientists REALLY KNOW about the HEALTH RISKS 
of this contamination? 
They know 
very little 
They know 
something 
They know 
a great deal 
I- - --I----I----I----I----I - ---I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
14. How did you, personally, learn about this contamination 
problem and its risks? (Please write in.) 
In 1990, the EPA decided that the best way to SOLVE THE 
PROBLEM OF PCB POLLUTION in the Acushnet River would be to 
dredge the most contaminated sediments from the river and to 
incinerate (burn) the sediments in a special incinerator. 
This incinerator would have been temporarily assembled in 
the North End of New Bedford. 
Now, the 
has been 
CHOSEN. 
polluted 
dredging is under way but the incinerator decision 
suspended while A NEW CLEAN-UP TECHNOLOGY IS 
The next nine questions concern the CLEAN-UP of the 
Acushnet River sediments. 
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is. Do you think that it is SAFER TO HUMANS, AND BETTER FOR 
THE ENVIRONMENT, for the EPA to REMOVE (dredge) the most 
contaminated sediments from the Acushnet River, or to LEAVE 
them in place? 
Do not dredge 
sediments 
Not 
sure 
Dredge 
sediments 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
16. As a way of REDUCING THE RISKS associated with the PCB 
and metals contamination of the Acushnet River, INCINERATION 
would be: 
Completely 
unacceptable 
Not 
sure 
Completely 
acceptable 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
17. How would you rate the HEALTH RISK OF INCINERATING PCBS 
AND TOXIC METALS in the North End of New Bedford? 
No 
risk 
Moderate 
risk 
Extremely 
risky 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
18. In terms of HEALTH RISKS, what specific aspects of 
INCINERATION would most concern you? (Please RANK 1 - 5, 
where 1 is the most important, 5 is least important.) 
Air pollution (respiratory disease) 
Chance of fire 
Toxic ash 
Chance of explosion 
Chance of spills or accidental releases 
Other (Please name) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
148 
19. In terms of HEALTH RISKS FROM AIR EMMISSIONS 
(SMOKESTACK) FROM THE INCINERATION, what possible RELEASES 
would most concern you? 
(Again, please RANK, 1 - 6, where 1 is most important, 6 is 
least important.) 
Dioxin 
Heavy Metals (such as lead) 
PCBs 
Greenhouse gasses 
Radiation 
Other toxic chemicals 
Other (Please name) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
20. The Government's (EPA's) scientists have stated that 
the INCINERATION would present LITTLE OR NO HEALTH RISK to 
surrounding residents. In your judgement, how much do the 
scientists REALLY KNOW ABOUT THE HEALTH RISKS of this 
incineration? 
They know 
very little 
They know 
something 
They know 
a great deal 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21. If the Government (EPA) does know about the r i sks of 
incineration, to what extent do you think they TELL THE 
PUBLIC THE TRUTH about such risks? 
They tell 
very little 
of the truth 
They tell 
some of 
the truth 
They tell 
the truth 
100% 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
22. HOW CLEAN, AND HOW SAFE, do you expect the Acushnet 
River to be when the Government (EPA) is DONE CLEANING IT 
UP? 
As dirty & 
unsafe as 
before 
Safe for 
swimming 
Fish will 
be edible 
Shellfish will 
be edible 
I----I----I----I- - --I----1----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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23. In general, how GOOD A JOB is the Government (EPA) 
doing to PROTECT THE HEALTH of the public as regards the New 
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site? 
A poor job An O.K. job An excel-
lent job 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I--- - I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
24. What, in your opinion, would be the overall ECONOMIC 
EFFECT of the proposed INCINERATOR on the Greater New 
Bedford Area? 
Harmful 
economic effect 
No economic 
effect 
Beneficial 
economic effect 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
25. What, in your opinion, would be the overall ECONOMIC 
EFFECT on the Greater New Bedford Area of HAVING A CLEANER 
HARBOR? 
Positive 
economic effect 
No economic 
effect 
Negative economic 
effect 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
26. WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE regarding the harbor 
cleanup? (Please CHECK ALL that apply) . 
Clean-up should provide j~bs .................... .. .. . 
Clean-up should restore environment ..... . ........... . 
Clean-up should restore commercial options of harbor. 
Clean-up should enhance tourism ........ . ....... . .. . . . 
Clean-up should improve property values ........ . . . .. . 
Clean-up should make fish edible . .. ........... . ..... . 
---
---
---
---
---
Clean-up should not cost taxpayers money ............. ---
Other (Please write in) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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There will always be some degree of trade-off between the 
need to guarantee public health and safety, and the need to 
find a cost-effective way of cleaning up the contamination 
in New Bedford Harbor. The following questions concern the 
COST OF CLEANING UP THE HARBOR, whether by incineration or 
any other means. Regardless of the method finally chosen, 
the cleanup of the harbor will cost many millions of 
dollars. 
27. What do you consider to be the BEST BALANCE between 
assurance of PUBLIC HEALTH, and COST of cleanup. 
clean-up 
must be as 
inexpensive 
as possible 
Health 
and cost 
are equally 
important 
Public health 
is most important, 
regardless of 
cost 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
28. Who will pay for this cleanup? 
29. How much would you, personally, be WILLING TO PAY IF 
YOU COULD BE SURE that the Acushnet river would be cleaned 
to the point where FISH AND SHELLFISH WERE SAFE TO EAT, and 
the river was SAFE FOR CHILDREN TO SWIM in? 
One-time payment, in dollars: 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I--~-I----I----I----I 
0 $1 $5 $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 $1000 Over 
$1000 
30. How much would you, personally, be WILLING TO PAY IF 
YOU COULD BE SURE that the Acushnet river would be cleaned 
to the point where it was NO LONGER HIGHLY CONTAMINATED, but 
still NOT SAFE ENOUGH TO SWIM OR FISH? 
One-time payment, in dollars: 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
O $1 $5 $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 $1000 Over 
$1000 
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31. In your opinion, has the Government (EPA) done a GOOD 
JOB OF INFORMING THE PUBLIC about the CURRENT RISKS of the 
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site on the Acushnet River? 
Poor 
job 
O.K. 
job 
Excellent 
job 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I--- - I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
32. In your opinion, has the Government (EPA) done a good 
job of INFORMING THE PUBLIC about its PROPOSED CLEANUP of 
the Acushnet River sediments? 
Poor 
job 
O.K. 
job 
Excellent 
job 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
33. In your opinion, has the Government (EPA) done a good 
job of LISTENING TO THE PUBLIC about the Superfund Site and 
its cleanup? 
Poor 
job 
O.K. 
job 
Excellent 
job 
I----I----I----I----I--- - I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
34. In your opinion, to what extent would the Government 
(EPA) LET PUBLIC OPINION INFLUENCE ITS DECISIONS regarding 
the Superfund Site and its cleanup? In other words, HOW 
MUCH OF A SAY does the local public really have in the 
Government's decisions? 
Public 
has no 
say 
Public has 
moderate 
say 
Public 
has 
great say 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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35. What could the Government have done to IMPROVE THE 
PROCESS OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT at the New Bedford Harbor 
superfund Site? (Please RANK 1 - 7, where 1 is the most 
important, 7 is the least important.) 
More public meetings 
Radio & television spots 
More programs in schools 
More newspaper coverage 
Door to door information campaign 
Mailings 
Other (Please write in) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Dealing with scientific uncertainty is part of any Superfund 
clean-up. The next five questions relate to this 
uncertainty, in the context of Superfund decisionmaking in 
New Bedford Harbor. 
36. Given that SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY must be a reality of 
decisions regarding the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, 
do you think that the uncertainty -- the doubt -- about the 
risks FAVORS THE CLEANUP, or FAVORS LEAVING THE SITE AS-IS? 
Leave site 
as-is. 
Not 
sure 
Clean up 
the site. 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
37. In your opinion, how important is it to HURRY THE 
CLEANUP of the harbor along? 
Time scale 
is 
unimportant 
Moderate 
delays 
acceptable 
Site must 
be cleaned up 
immediately 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
38. Please explain briefly the factors influencing your 
judgement on Question 36: 
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I 
I 
I ' 
I 
39. Again, given that there is scientific uncertainty 
regarding both the risks of the contamination and the risk 
of the cleanup, how should we deal with SCIENTIFIC 
UNCERTAINTY in CHOOSING A CLEANUP METHOD for New Bedford 
Harbor? 
Need a proven, 
time-tested 
technology 
The two are 
equally 
important 
Need an 
innovative 
technology 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
40. In conclusion, do you feel that it would be a GREATER 
HEALTH RISK to LEAVE the contaminated Acushnet sediments 
where they currently sit, or to TREAT THEM BY INCINERATION? 
Existing 
contamination 
is greatest risk 
Equal 
risks 
Incineration 
is greatest 
risk 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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B. 3. Coverletter for administration of survey to public 
random sample (Group 2), Portuguese. 
P 0 R T U G U E S 
Questionario de o Porto de New Bedford 
Estimado Senhora ou Senhor: 
Como voce provavelmente sabe, os sedimentos (lodos) do rio 
Acushnet estao contaminados com altos niveles de PBC (PCBs 
ou bifenilos polyclorinados), especialmente na area norte da 
ponte do Caminho Coggeshall (Coggeshall St. Bridge) . Esta 
contaminacao tern sido uma funte de contravencao, duranto os 
ultimos anos. O Governo Federal, e o estado de 
Massachusetts, e varios grupos locales tern tentado resolver 
este problema. 
Este questionario e para voce poder dar a sua opiniao, da 
area que o Governo Federal chama o "New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site." Nos esperamos que este questinario no leve 
mais de que 15 minutes para complitar. Estas preguntas sao 
para voce dar a sua opiniao, emtam nao a uma resposta que e 
mais certa de que outra. Por favor complete todas as 
preguntos. 
Como voce vive na area que esta contaminado nos queremos 
saber sua opiniao. A suas respostas as preguntas que nos 
preguntamos vao ser CONFIDENCIAL. Depois de obter a 
informacao, nos vamos destruir os questionarios. 
Se voce tern alguma pregunta por favor entre en contacto com 
nos. Pode conversar com Dr. Niels West, 401-792-2596 o com 
o Vice Preboste de Investigacao, 70 Lower College Rd., 
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881, 401-792-
2635. Eu agradeco sua ajuda. 
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Obrigado, 
(Signed) 
(Researcher name 
and affiliation) 
B. 4 · Public version of survey (Groups 1 and 2), 
Portuguese. 
QUESTIONARIO 
Acerca do 
PORTO DO NEW BEDFORD 
Este questionario deve levar 15 minutes para completar. Por 
favor leia cada pregunta cuidadosamente, e responda 
completamente. NAO A RESPOSTAS CORRECTAS OU ERRADAS. Suas 
respostas sera confidencial. 
---------------------------------------------------------
Nome: Data: 
Endereco: Cidade: 
A quanto tempo vive cerca New Bedford? anos 
Empregador: __________________________ _ 
Posiciao: 
----------------------------
Que faz essa companhia? 
1. Sabes que existe um SUPERFUND SITIO (CONTAMINACAO 
PERIGOSA) no rio de Acushnet? 
Sim Nao 
2. Se sua resposta e positiva, A QUANTO TEMPO JA SABE deste 
sitio? (Escolha um) 
Menos de que 6 mezes ...... ___ _ 
Entre 6 mezes e um ano ... . 
----1 - 2 anos ................ ___ _ 
2 - 5 anos ............. . . . 
----Mais de que 5 anos ........ . 
----
3. La participaste num grupo que occupa-se de este asunto do 
"Superfund Site?" 
Sim Nao 
4. Se a resposta e positiva qual e o nome do groupo: 
Quando partisipaste neste groupo? 
(Mez/Ano) 
5. Furna cigarettes? Sim 
! __ ate __ ! __ 
As vezes Nao 
6. Fez uso do cinto de seguranca cuando guia um automovel? 
Sim As vezes Nao 
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7. Como e que recebe sua INFORMACAO sabre eventos LOCALES? 
(Marca todos que aplicam) 
Radio 
Television 
Journal ( qual) 
Conversa com amigos o vecinos, o no trabalho 
Filhos aprendem na escola 
Reuniaos publicas 
Otras formas (escrevaque tipo) 
Qual e MAIS IMPORTANTE? 
segunde mais importante 
As seguintes preguntas sao dirigidas a o projecto "Superfund 
Site" no porto de New Bedford. Umas das preguntas faz uso do 
"Likert Scale" para symbolizar o disposto de valor entre duas 
situacaos. Marca com um "X." 
E X E M P L 0 
X. Em sua opiniao, qual e o melhor dia para ir a praia? 
Dia 
nubrado 
Qualquer 
dia 
Dia de 
sol 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
De acordo com a Agencia de Proteccao do Ambiente, e o 
Departamento do Ambiente de Massachusetts, o rio de Acushnet 
est a contaminado com altos ni vels de PBC ( PCBs) e metales 
toxicos. Nao considera as actividades de limpeza duranto o 
ultimo ano. 
8. A qual grau de valor voce pensa que a comtaminaciao do rio 
Acushnet representa PERIGO A SAUDE? 
Nao e perigo 
corrente 
Perigo 
mediano 
Grande 
:p=rigo 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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9. Em. sua opiniao quern e que esta em prigodo desta 
comtaminacao? 
(Marca todos que aplicam) 
criancas ..................................... . ...... . 
Gente de idade maior .............................. . . . ----
----Gente duente .............................. . ......... . 
A ti proprio ..... . .................................. . 
Gente quern come peixe .................. . .... . ... . ... . 
----
----
----Gente que usam barcos ........................... . ... . 
----Os Portugueses ...................................... . 
----Quern nao e Portugues ................................ . 
----A gente que vive na area que esta comtaminada ... . .... ___ _ 
Todos que vivem em New Bedford .................. . ... . 
----Todos que vivem em Acushnet ............ . ............ . 
----Todos que vivem em Fair Haven ........... . ........... . 
----Todos que vivem em Dartmouth ........................ . 
----Todos que vivem sul este de Massachusetts ...... . .... . 
----
Otra gente (por favor escreva) 
10. Em sua opiniao, qual sao os perigos da comtaminacao? 
(Marca todos que aplicam) 
Cancero ...... . ........ . Leukemia .......... . . 
----Doencas da pel ........ . 
----
Problemas sexual es .. ----
Problemas respiratorios 
----Problemas do figado .... 
----
Problemas das rimes. 
Problemas do cerebro ___ _ 
Problemas do coracao ... 
----
Otros problemas (por favor escreva) 
11 . Na sua opiniao, COME e 
transferidos do rio a humanos? 
Respirando oar .... 
----Cavando a terra .... 
----Comendo piexe ..... . 
----
que estes perigos podem ser 
(Marca todos que aplicam) 
Bebendo agua ......... . .. . 
----Passar a nadar .......... . 
...,.----Comendo vegetales do j ardim __ 
Otras formas (por favor escreva) 
12. Es um piscador comercial, ou alguem da tua familia? 
Sim Nao 
Relacao: Tu mesmo 
----
Familia proxima 
----Familia 
----
Amigos 
----
Que tipo de pesca? 
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13. 0 Govervo (EPA) fez imvastigacaos que indicarao que a 
coMTAMlNACAO do rio Acushnet representa um perigo a o povo 
local. Em sua opiniao, QUANTO SABE o governo dos perigos que 
existe no rio? 
sabem Sabem Sabem 
muito poco poco muito 
l----l----1----1----l----l----l----I----l----l----l 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
14. Como e que voce informo-se dos PERlGOS e da comtaminacao? 
Em 1990, o Governo (EPA) decidio que a melhor forma para 
RESOLVER 0 PROBLEMA DA COMTAMlNACAO do rio era para tirar, e 
queimar os sedimentos. 0 forno de incineracao era para ser 
construido temperiamente em o Norte de New Bedford. 
Agora a limpeza continua, mais o forno de incineracao AlNDA 
NAO FOl CONSTRUlDO. As preguntas que siguem sao dirigidas 
limpeza do Rio. 
15. En sua opiniao, acha que a limpeza do Rio TEM BENEFlClOS 
PARA TODOS, E PARA 0 AMBlENTE, ou deve o Governo (EPA) deixar 
todo como esta? 
Tirar 
os sedimentos 
do Rio 
Nao f az 
diferenca 
Diexe 
os sedimentos 
f icar 
l----l----l----l----I----1----1----l----l----l----l 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
16. Da perspectiva da sua saude, acha que incinerar os PBC 
(PBCs) e metales e: 
Totalmente 
inaceitavel 
Nao estou 
seguro 
Totalmente 
aceitavel 
l----l----l----l----l----l----l----1----1----l----l 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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17. Referir-se A SAUDE, corno rnedes os PERIGOS DE QUEIMAR os 
corntarninante em o Norte de New Bedford? 
Nao a 
perigoso 
Pou co Muito perigo 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
18. Referir-se A SAUDE, qual ea RAZAO que voce nao aceita o 
forno de INCINERACAO? (Maree de 1 -- rnais irnportante, a 5 --
menos irnportante) 
Problernas respiratorios 
Perigo de f ogo 
Cinzas toxicas 
Explosaos 
Derrarnos toxicos 
Otra razao (Qual) 
19. REFERIR-SE A SAUDE, qual das DESCARGOS DA CHAMINE te 
preocupa? 
(Maree de 1 -- rnais irnportante, a 6 -- rnenos irnportante) 
Dioxin 
Metales pesados (tales corno plorno) 
PBC (PBCs) 
Gases do efeito invernado (greenhouse gasses) 
Radiaciao 
Otros quirnicos toxicos 
Otras (Qual) 
20. O Governo indica que o forno de incineracao e seguro. 
QUANTO achas que o Governo (EPA) REALMENTE SABE SOBRE 0 PERIGO 
do f orno de incineracao? 
Sabe rnuito 
pouco 
Sabe 
pouco 
Sabe 
rnuito 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21. Seo Governo (EPA) sabe dos perigos, QUANTO ACHAS QUE DIZ 
ou povo? 
Nao dizern 
nada 
Dizern 
pouco 
Dizern 
100% 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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22. Achas que o Rio vai ficar? 
Como estava 
antes 
(perigoso) 
De f orma 
de poder 
nadar 
De f orma 
de poder 
piscar para 
comer 
De f orma 
de poder 
comer os 
mariscos 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
23. Achas que o Governo (EPA) esta protegimdo a saude do povo 
da contaminacao? 
Nao Mais o menos Excelente 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
24. Em sua opiniao, qual sera o EFEITO ECONOMICO de ter o 
forno de incineracao na area de New Bedford? 
Efeito 
economico 
negative 
Ningum 
efeito 
economico 
EEeit.cs 
ec:nnanico 
p:>sitivo 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
25. Em sua opiniao, qual sera o EFEITO ECONOMICO na area de 
New Bedford de ter o RIO LIMPO? 
Efeito 
economico 
negative 
Ningum 
efeito 
economico 
Efeit.cs 
ec:nnanico 
p:>sitivo 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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26. Que gustarias de ver associado com a limpeza do Rio? 
(Marca todos que aplicam) 
A limpeza devia de produzir trabalos .... .. ............ . 
---A limpeza devia de restorar o ambiante .. . ............ . . 
---A limpeza devia de restorar o comerco da area ....... . . . 
---A limpeza devia de proteguir a saude do povo da area ... 
---A limpeza devia de melhorar o valor da propriedade .. . .. 
---A limpeza devia de pirmitir o comsume do peixe . ....... . 
---A limpeza devia de nao levantar os impostas ........... . 
---
Otras (Por favor escreva) 
sempre existe um grau de compromisso entre a necesidade de uma 
garantia para a saude, e a seguridade publica, asim como a 
necesidade de encontrar uma maneira efeitiva de limpar a 
comtaminacao do Porto de New Bedford. As siguintes preguntas 
sao dirigidas ou PRECO DE LIMPAR O RIO. De todas as formas a 
limpeza vai custar milhoes de dolaras. 
27. Que opinas e o MELHOR BALANCO entre a GARANTIA DA SAUDE 
e o PRECO DA LIMPEZA? 
A limpeza deve 
ser o mais 
barato possivel 
A saude e o preco 
sao egual de 
importancia 
A saude publica 
e o mais 
importante 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
28. Quern deve pagar para esta limpeza? 
29. QUANTO PAGARAS PAR TER A CERTEZA que o Rio vai ser bem 
limpo, e que se pode COMER MARISCOS E PEIXE, e tambem as 
CRIANCAS PODEM NADAR no Rio? 
So uma vez (dolaras) : 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
O $1 $5 $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 $1000 Sobre 
$1000 
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30. QUANTO PAGARAS PARA TERA CERTEZA que o Rio vai ser bem 
limpo, e que nao teija comtaminado e nao e seguro para nadar 
ou pescar? 
so uma vez (dolaras) : 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
O $1 $5 $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 $1000 Sobre 
$1000 
31. Em sua opiniao, o PERIGO DA COMTAMINACAO foi BEM 
POBLICADO por o Governo (EPA)? 
Nao Mais o menos Excelente 
I----I----I----I----I-- - -I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3 2 . Em sua opiniao, o Governo - (EPA) INFORMOU BEM 0 POVO da 
LIMPEZA do Rio? 
Nao Mais o menos Excelente 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I-- - -I--- - I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
33. Em sua opiniao, o Governo (EPA) PRESTO ATENCAO A OPINIAO 
PUBLICA acerca da comtaminacao e a limpeza? 
Nao Mais o menos Excelente 
I----I - ---I--- - I----I----I----I 7- --I----I - ---I - ---I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
34. Em sua opiniao, ACHAS QUE 0 POVO LOCAL TEVE ALGUM PODER 
em que o Governo (EPA) vai fazer com a limpeza do Rio? 
Pou co Mais o menos Mui to 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I--- - I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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35. Que podia ter feito o Governo (EPA) para INCLUIR O POVO 
NO PROGREDIMENTO da limpeza do Rio? (Marca de 1 - 7. 1 mais 
importante; 7 menos importante) 
Mais renioes publicas 
Anuncios no radio e TV 
Mais programas nas escolas 
Mais anuncios no jornal 
Inf ormacao de porta a porta 
Correia 
Otras formas (Por favor escreva) 
As preguntas que siguem sao dirigidas a duvida do Governo 
(EPA) na limpeza do Rio. 
36. Sem os resoltados ser domostrados na limpeza do Porto de 
New Bedford, achas que o Governo deve limpar o Rio ou deixar-
lo como esta? 
Deixa 
com esta 
Nao esta 
seguro 
Em favor 
da limpeza 
I----I----r----r----I----r----r----I----r----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
37. Em sua opiniao, o Rio deve ser limpo apressadamente? 
O tempo 
nao e 
importante 
Demore moderade 
se pode 
aceitar 
Deve ser 
limpo 
imediatamente 
I----I----I----r----r----I----r~---I----I----r----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
38. Qual sao os fatores que influio a sua resposta na 
pregunta 36. 
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39. Otra vez, referindonos a os trabalhos cientificos que NAO 
DAO CERTEZA DO PERIGO QUE EXISTE em limpar o Rio, como devemos 
escolher o sistema de limpar o Porto de New Bedford? 
Com uma 
tecnologia 
provada 
As duas 
sao 
importante 
Necesitarros 
uma nova 
tecnologia 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
40. Em conclusao, achas que DEIXAR os comtaminentos no Rio E 
MAIS PERIGOSO, ou QUEIMARLOS NO FORNO DE INCINERACAO DA MAIS 
PERIGO? 
A comtaminacao 
e o perigo 
maior 
Equal 
Incineracao 
e o perigo 
maior 
I----I----I----I----I----1----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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B. 5. Sample of personalized coverletter used to 
administer survey to smaller groups (Groups 1, 3, 
and 4}. 
(Subject name and address) 
5 October 1994 
Dear Marguerite: 
Enclosed are copies of the survey which we discussed by 
telephone this week, along with a couple of return envelopes. 
I realize how busy you are; thanks for agreeing to take the 
time to participate in this study. 
If some of the questions seem rather basic, please bear 
with me; parts of this survey are being administered to a 
broad cross-section of people, not all of whom are likely to 
be as familiar with this type of site as you are. I don't 
think the survey will take any more than 15 minutes of your 
time. There are, of course, no right or wrong answers; please 
read the questions carefully, then answer them in the way that 
best reflects your personal opinion. I am not interested in 
official statements or agency positions, but rather, would 
like to know how you, personally, perceive this situation . 
The information which you provide will be kept completely 
confidential. The surveys will be destroyed once the results 
are tabulated. Again, I realize the demands of your schedule, 
but would be most appreciative if you were able to return the 
survey within a week or two. 
If you have any comments, questions, or complaints about 
the survey, you may contact myself; . my advisor, Dr. Niels 
West, 401-792-2596; or the Vice Provost for Research, 70 Lower 
College Rd., University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881, 
401-792-2635. Thank you; I look forward to your response. 
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Sincerely, 
(Researcher name, 
affiliation, and 
address) 
B. 6. Survey questions specific to professional groups 
(Groups 3 and 4) . 
SURVEY --
Concerning the NEW BEDFORD HARBOR SUPERFUND SITE, 
Upper Acushnet River, New Bedford, Massachusetts. 
The following survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. 
Please read each question carefully, then answer them as 
completely and accurately as possible. There are no right or 
wrong answers; please note that I am looking for your personal 
opinion, not an official agency or departmental position. 
Your responses will be kept completely confidential . Thank 
you for your time . 
Date: 
Have you lived in the New Bedford area? 
If so, for how long? 
1. How °long have you 
environmental management? 
years 
been involved, 
years 
--- ---
generally, in 
2. In working on a particular site, how often, on average, do 
you converse with non-professionals stakeholders 
interested in a site? (Please CHECK ONE.) 
At least once a day ........ . 
---Several times per week . . ... . 
Once a week .... ... . .... .. ... ---
Several times per month .. . . . 
Once a month ................ ---
Less than once a month ..... . 
---Varies too much to say ..... . 
---
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3. Please characterize your role in site management by 
RANKING the following, where 1 is the most important, 5 is 
least. 
Managerial 
Technical 
Legal 
Public information 
Other (Please write in) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
4. Do you smoke cigarettes? 
Yes Sometimes No 
---
5. Do you wear a seatbelt when you drive? 
Yes Sometimes No 
---
The rest of this survey asks about the New Bedford Harbor 
Superfund Site and its clean-up. Some of the questions make 
use of a line, called a Likert scale, which symbolizes a range 
of values between two opposite ideas. PLEASE READ EACH 
QUESTION CAREFULLY, THEN PLACE AN "X" anywhere along the line, 
at the point which best reflects your judgement. 
EXAMPLE 
X. In your opinion, what is a good day to go to the beach? 
Cloudy 
day only 
Any 
day 
Sunny 
day only 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I-~--I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
6. Regarding governmental environmental management decisions, 
do you feel that public involvement is, in general, a help or 
a hindrance to the sound execution of a project? (Please mark 
scale where appropriate.) 
Hindrance Does not 
matter 
Help 
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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7 . As you know, the federal Superfund law (CERCLA) is up for 
reauthorization this year or next. All else being equal, do 
you think that Superfund's public involvement mandate should 
be increased or decreased in this revision? 
Decrease Keep it 
the same 
Increase 
I----l----1----1----I----l - ---I----I----I----I----I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Appendix C: List of Acronyms 
ADR: Alternative dispute resolution. 
APA: Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 701 et 
~ 
ATSDR: US Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. 
ARARs: Applicable and relevant or appropriate requirements. 
CDF: Confined disposal facility. 
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980, amended in 1986 by SARA. 42 U.S.C. 
Sections 9601 et seq. 
C.F.R.: Code of Federal Regulations. 
CPFH: Concerned Parents of Fair Haven. 
CWA: Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C .. 1251 et seq. 
cy: Cubic yard. 
DC: Downwind Coalition. 
DRE: Dioxin removal efficiency. 
EIS: Environmental impact statement. 
ESD: Explanation of significant differences. 
FS: Feasibility study. 
FFA: Federal Facilities Agreement. 
GNBCWG: Greater New Bedford Community Work Group. 
HATR: Hands Across the River. 
HRS: Hazard Ranking System. 
HSPP: Hot Spot Proposed Plan. 
LULU: Locally unwanted land use . 
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 
4321 et seq . 
NIMBY: Not in my back yard. 
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
NPL: National Priorities List. 
PAHs: Polyaromatic hydrocarbons. 
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PCBs: Polychlorinated biphenols. 
ppm: Parts per million. 
PRP: Potentially responsible party. 
RA: Risk assessment. 
RI: Remedial investigation. 
RAMP: Remedial Action Master Plan. 
RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 
6901 et ~ 
ROD: Record of Decision. 
SARA: Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 
42 U.S.C. Sections 9601 et seq. 
SS: Statistically significant. 
SSD: Statistically significant difference. 
TAG: Technical advisory grant. 
TSCA: Toxic Substances and Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. 
Sections 2601 et seq. 
U.S.C.: United States Code. 
USDOE: US Department of Energy. 
USEPA: US Environmental Protection Agency. 
USGS: US Geological Survey. 
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